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Taking Back the Streets? How Street Art
Ordinances Constitute Government
Takings
Sheldon A. Evans*
As street art continues to fuel a generation of counterculture and
gains popularity in pop culture, laws enacted by local governments to
curb this art form raise interesting constitutional issues surrounding the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. More and more cities across America are classifying street art and graffiti as public nuisances. Such municipalities impose their agenda on private property owners with street
art ordinances. These laws allow the government to come onto private
property to remove the street art; some laws go even further by requiring
the property owner to remove the street art at his own cost. This Article
attempts to make sense of the Takings Clause’s tumultuous doctrines
and their underlying principles in order to analyze this anti-street art
campaign. In the process, this Article analyzes whether street art ordinances constitute takings under the Fifth Amendment due to their potential negative economic impact on property values and the temporary deprivation of essential property rights.
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INTRODUCTION
As a property owner, discovering graffiti on your property can
be like discovering a latent liability or striking oil. Without your
consent, some member of the counterculture has used your pristine
building, wall, or other surface as a canvas to forward their artistic
agenda. To add insult to injury, they have left you to clean up the
mess. Further, the city in which you live has specific laws that require the following: either you paint over the graffiti at your own
cost or give consent to city workers to do the same. As a property
owner with legitimate interests in your property value, removal of
such blight in the usual case could not come sooner. But what if
this graffiti was more than the product of rival gangs marking their
territory; what if it was more than artistic teenagers seeking a thrill;
what if it was more than underground artists trying to make a name
for themselves? What if, instead, it was the stencil of an unassum-
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ing rat,1 of two lovers,2 or even a girl on a swing?3 In that case, as
this Article endeavors to demonstrate, everything changes due to
the constitutional calculus and the economic rights of the property
owner.
Street art, as such public displays of uncommissioned art are
commonly referred to, is becoming more of a common social phenomena in urban centers. This is so much the case that many
American cities have gone to extreme lengths to adopt strict laws
and penalties to curb street artists. Such laws, however, not only
seek to punish the artist but also the owner of the canvas; these
street art ordinances impose stiff penalties on property owners who
do not take appropriate steps to remove street art from their property. These laws affect property owners’ rights to exclude others
from the property, to benefit from improvements to their property,
and to manage and enjoy their property as they see fit. The loss of
such important property rights elicits interesting constitutional issues under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.4 After all, private ownership of property (and the rights that accompany such
ownership) has been described from the beginning of the Union as
among the most important and fundamental virtues necessary to
build a free society.5 Further, in a day and age when street art is
1

See Deborah Vankin, Banksy’s Haight Street Rat Scampers Down to U.S. Bank Tower
in L.A., L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/
arts/culture/la-et-cm-banksy-haight-street-rat-us-bank-tower-los-angeles-20140924story.html (highlighting Banksy’s rat stencil in Los Angeles).
2
See Banksy Artwork Saves Youth Club as it Sells for £400k, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 27,
2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/11059481/Banksy-artworksaves-youth-club-as-it-sells-for-400k.html (highlighting Banksy stencil “Mobile
Lovers”).
3
See Andrian Glick Kudler, Some LA Street Art Worth $650K, Some Worth Felony
Charges, CURBED LOS ANGELES (Apr. 9, 2014), http://la.curbed.com/archives/
2014/04/in_los_angeles_some_street_art_is_worth_650k_and_some_is_worth_felon
y_charges.php (highlighting Banksy stencil of a girl on a swing in a Los Angeles parking
lot).
4
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5
See James W. Ely, Jr., “That due satisfaction may be made:” the Fifth Amendment and
the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1 (1992) (“[T]he notion
that property ownership was essential for the enjoyment of liberty has long been a
fundamental tenet of Anglo-American constitutional thought.” (citing JOHN PHILLIP
REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF
RIGHTS 27–33 (1986))); see also Cameron Madigan, Taking for Any Purpose?, 9 HASTINGS
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enjoying immense popularity as an art form, the imposition of the
state upon a property owner to remove street art can actually damage the value of his property.
This Article argues that such street art ordinances—without
built-in judicial oversight or proper means of administrative challenges—should constitute a government taking pursuant to the
Takings Clause. This Article forwards its argument in six parts.
Part I introduces street art, its definition, and its culture. Upon investigation, it becomes apparent that this art form has gained traction in popular culture, which has created a market demand that
can benefit property owners. Part II lays out the conflicting ideology of the rule of law in many major metropolitan areas, with a particular focus on Los Angeles’s anti-graffiti scheme. Many city governments across the United States continue to classify street art as
a public nuisance that harms the community. After these ordinances are introduced, Part III continues by outlining the constitutional
backdrop. Making sense of this body of law is no small feat, and this
Article attempts to clarify conflicting doctrines by analyzing the
Supreme Court’s underlying principles in applying the Takings
Clause. Next, Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of street art
ordinances and whether the forced removal of potentially valuable
street art is an unconstitutional taking. Ultimately, this Article argues that street art ordinances can constitute unconstitutional takings, and proposes solutions to remedy this problem. This Article
concludes with a brief summary of unconstitutional street art ordinances and the hope that legal scholarship will further explore this
issue.
I. THE STREET ART MOVEMENT — A COUNTER CULTURE
If art is to nourish the roots of our culture, society must
set the artist free to follow his vision wherever it takes
him.
-John Fitzgerald Kennedy6

W.-NW J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 179 (2002–2003) (quoting John Adams: “Property must be
secured or liberty cannot exist.” (citation omitted)).
6
SIMON G. ANRINK, JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE MAN AND THE PRESIDENCY 105 (1987).

2015]

TAKING BACK THE STREETS?

689

Philosophers have recognized the social impact of visual art for
centuries.7 Visual art shapes a new reality derived from the artist’s
perceptions, communicating to audiences through expressive functions and symbols.8 In this way, art as a method of communication
is somewhat innate and dates back to the beginning of humanity.9
One could even say that street art was the first art form; for over
30,000 years, the human race has used walls of buildings, homes,
caves, trees, and other mediums to communicate stories.10 This is
no surprise considering that the English word “graffiti” is derived
from the Italian word “graffiare,” meaning “‘to scratch,’ which
refers to the earliest forms of graffiti etched into walls and trees.”11
In order to further explore this topic in the present day, it is
important to discern what the term “street art” means in culture,
and also in the context of this Article. It can mean many different
7

Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and the Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the
Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221, 224 n.12 (1987) (citation
omitted) (“Plato, for example, considered artists so powerful and influential that they
were to be outlawed in his ideal Republic unless they served the state. His concern was
their corrupting influence.”).
8
See id. at 223 (citing H. READ, ICON AND IDEA 105 (1955); H. READ, ART AND
ALIENATION 162–64 (1967)).
9
John McMillen & Rebecca Atkinson, Artists and Athletes: Balancing the First
Amendment and the Right of Publicity in Sport Celebrity Portraits, 14 J. LEGAL ASPECTS
SPORT 117, 118 (2004) (“Individual interpretive expression dates back to the beginning of
human civilization to the Paleolithic, Mesolithic, and Neolithic time periods and has
appeared in every culture since.” (citing E.H. GOMBRICH, THE STORY OF ART 39–43
(16th ed. 1995))).
10
Christian Ehret, Mural Rights: Establishing Standing for Communities Under American
Moral Rights Laws, 10 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3 (2010) (“The origins of mural art have
been traced back more than 30,000 years, evidenced by prehistoric images of animals
found painted on the walls of the Chauvet Cave in Southern France. Throughout history,
murals have been employed by man to tell stories and to convey artistic expression. The
Ajanta Caves in Maharashtra, India, date back to the third century B.C. and contain
intricate mural art depicting the Jataka stories. The San Bartolo murals in Guatemala
were created in the first century B.C. and represent an important part of Mayan
history.”).
11
Sarah Stephens, Fun with Vandalism: The Illegal Street Art of Shepard Fairey and
Banksy 9 (2014) (published M.A. thesis, University of Cincinnati), available at
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/ap/10?0::NO:10:P10_ACCESSION_NUM:ucin1148076772#ex
port-ris); see also SCAPE MARTINEZ, GRAFF: THE ART & TECHNIQUE OF GRAFFITI 8
(2009); CARLO MCCORMICK, The Writing on the Wall, in ART IN THE STREETS 20 (Jeffrey
Deitch et al., eds., 2011). Under this definition, graffiti cannot be a moral wrong because
even God has participated in graffiti etching the Decalogue out of stone and writing the
eerie prophecy on the wall of King Belshazzar’s demise.
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things to different people with different interests. The term is connected to the negative connotation that “graffiti” earned in society, where graffiti was commonly associated with gang tagging that
marked territory.12 Thus, even though many street artists use graffiti to paint their art, they would scoff at being lumped together
with those who use graffiti to scribble gang signs and affiliations.13
Nevertheless, exploring such debate is beyond the scope of this Article;14 instead, the term “street art” will refer to any uncommissioned artwork, mural, or artistic writing, excluding gang tagging.
The term includes artwork done using paint, graffiti, markers,
stencils, stickers, tiles, adhesive, or other writing methods, all
without the prior permission of the property owner.15
12

Margaret L. Mettler, Comment, Graffiti Museum: A First Amendment Argument for
Protecting Uncommissioned Art on Private Property, 111 MICH. L. REV. 249, 254 (2012)
(citing CEDAR LEWISOHN, STREET ART: THE GRAFFITI REVOLUTION 18 (2008) (“One of
the principle [sic] reasons for making a distinction between street art and graffiti writing is
that graffiti has such a bad public reputation.”)).
13
LEWISOHN, supra note 12, at 31 (“Tagging was invented in the mid-1960s . . . . [The
graffiti before 1965] had largely been gang-related and ha[d] its own history and
traditions . . . . [Gang graffiti] is separate from graffiti writing. After around 1970, we can
clearly start to identify people doing graffiti writing as opposed to gang graffiti.”); Melissa
L. Hughes, Street Art & Graffiti Art: Developing an Understanding 5–11 (2009)
(published M.A. Ed. thesis, Georgia State University), available at
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/art_design_theses/50/ (exploring definitional differences
between the terms “street art” and “graffiti art”); Michelle Bougdanos, The Visual
Rights Act and Its Application to Graffiti Murals: Whose Wall is it Anyway?, 18 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 549, 558 (2002) (“Significantly, graffiti is no longer relegated to the streets.
It appears in museums, art exhibitions, and in galleries. Graffiti is not just the scrawling of
gang members but encompasses murals, fashion and has been the subject of several
films.” (footnotes omitted)); Deborah Laverty, Graffiti Art Preserves Jackson Legacy, NWI
TIMES (June 4, 2011, 7:50 PM), available at http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/
lake/gary/article_4cbcfa91-0037-5e5a-88fd-eceaae228324.html (quoting street artist
Gerry Guevara as saying “[s]ome people confuse graffiti with gangs, but this is entirely
different. We’re not claiming territory.”).
14
See Mettler, supra note 12, at 254 n.36 (“Much scholarly literature is devoted to
defining and distinguishing these categories.” (citing Marisa A. Gomez, Comment, The
Writing on Our Walls: Finding Solutions Through Distinguishing Graffiti Art from Graffiti
Vandalism, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 633, 644–51 (1993); Lori L. Hanesworth, Are They
Graffiti Artists or Vandals? Should They Be Able or Caned?: A Look at the Latest Legislative
Attempts to Eradicate Graffiti, 6 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 225, 226–27 (1996))).
15
This definition borrows from Mettler, supra note 12, at 254, in order to explore the
full range of problems and potential solutions in regards to the Takings Clause and
property ownership; see also Henri Buenders, The End of Arrogance, The Advent of
Persuasion: Public Art in a Multicultural Society, 51 SOC. ANALYSIS 42, 48 (2007) (“The
term ‘public art’ properly refers to works of art in any media that [have] been planned and
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The modern American street art movement16 emerged in Philadelphia17 and New York18 in the 1960s and 70s promoting social
commentary and democratization of art. While the cause of this
street art boom can only be speculated, the counterculture movement that emerged in America during this time was likely a contributing factor.19 It was an artistic expression that was not—and
could not be—relegated to posh galleries and “high art” shows.
Instead, it brought art to the everyman by displaying it in the most
accessible medium possible: open, public space.20 “The existence
of such works allows artistic expression to leave the confines of the
traditional gallery or museum and become accessible to everyone.”21 From the beginning of the modern movement until now,
pioneers22 and contemporaries used their street art as a way of “initiating . . . political change by creating public awareness, providing
a social critique, asserting a community’s identity, fostering team

executed with the specific intention of being sited or staged in the public domain, usually
outside and accessible to all.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
16
While the modern movement took off in the 1960s and 70s, this was not the first
emergence of American street art. See Bougdanos, supra note 13, at 558 (“The origins of
American graffiti can be traced from colonial times through the present. One of the most
famous and widespread examples of American graffiti was the Kilroy image that
American soldiers drew on the walls of the cities they occupied during World War II.”
(footnotes omitted)).
17
See Mettler, supra note 12, at 252 (citing GREGORY J. SNYDER, GRAFFITI LIVES:
BEYOND THE TAG IN NEW YORK’S URBAN UNDERGROUND 23 (2009)).
18
See Stephens, supra note 11, at 8; Buenders, supra note 15, at 48.
19
Buenders, supra note 15, at 44 (“Changes in social, political, and religious beliefs
have, throughout history, always resulted in parallel changes in the production of public
art . . . .”).
20
Id. at 48 (“Art had to be democratized and put on public display. This theory
became practice in the 1970s, when the aim of art was both embellishment and giving
meaning to the living environment of the ordinary citizen. Democratized art in a way
became a state ideology in some countries, celebrating the welfare state and at the same
time civilizing the people.”). This analysis reinforces the influence that many states saw
in the social power of art. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Ironically, the state has
lost sight of this in the modern era, and instead argues that street art contributes to
uncivilizing the masses. See infra Part II.
21
Ehret, supra note 10, at 4.
22
See Stephens, supra note 11, at 11 (identifying “Cornbread . . . , Top Cat,
SuperKOOL, Priest 167, and Pistol 1” as pioneers of the early evolution of graffiti
writing); see also Bougdanos, supra note 13, at 561 (describing street artist Keith Haring as
an influential part of New York street art culture in the 1980s).
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spirit, and sometimes encouraging action.”23 Such visual images
have been described as “catalyst[s]”24 that “can evoke passionate
responses,” especially in regard to political art.25 Street art has also
been described as a “complex composition of ideas incorporating
dreams, ambitions, myths, and fears—the many nuances of the objective and subjective self as a public entity.”26 Thus, these artists
seek to enlighten and educate blighted communities. By doing so,
they ironically do not see their illegal art as a contributing factor to
the blight.27 For some, the illegality of their craft is part of its allure
and plays into their social commentary.28 For their fans in the subculture, this same illegality seems to draw them in.29
Popular contemporary street artists who have risen to prominence in the subculture, including Shepard Fairey and Banksy, con23

Sabine Marschall, A Critical Investigation into the Impact of Community Mural Art,
TRANSFORMATION 40, 60 (2004) (citing A.W. BARNETT, COMMUNITY MURALS — THE
PEOPLE’S ART 15 (1984)).
24
Id.
25
K. Gelber, Distracting The Masses: Art, Local Government And Freedom Of Political
Speech In Australia, 10 L. TEXT CULTURE 195, 195 (2005); see also Susan Bird, Aesthetics,
Authority and the Outlaw of the Street, 3 J.L. & JUST. 1 (2009) (“I contend that graffiti
arouses such a response because it changes the way we experience the city. It causes an
interruption to a commercialized system of signs and codes. It offers a possibility of
difference and exposes cracks in the ordered routine of everyday life. Street art conveys a
lifestyle that baffles those driven by a world of economy. It takes inhabitants on a treasure
hunt to unknown places where countless gifts of creative, unexpected inspiration lie in
wait.”).
26
Buenders, supra note 15, at 44 (citation omitted).
27
See Laura Kaufman, Vandal or Artist?, L.A. TIMES: SAN DIEGO COUNTY ED., July 27,
1990, at F21B (The author interviewed Brett Cook, who uses unauthorized murals to
convey messages to the community. Cook claimed he hoped to spread understanding and
tolerance among blacks and other minority groups. He believed the importance of his
message, portrayed in artistic themes, outweighed stigma of the illegal installment.).
28
See Alfredo Aleman, Graffiti Artists Look Toward Los Angeles River for a Canvas, EGP
(Aug. 13, 2009), http://egpnews.com/?p=11988 (“‘This is the challenge, the more we
say you shouldn’t do it, the more inviting it is for [graffiti artists] to do it,’ said a street
artist known as Reyes, who believes much of graffiti’s thrill comes from its illegality.”
(alteration in original)); see also Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 857 F.
Supp. 1355, 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“Indeed, many writers thrive on the push and pull
with authorities that is inherent to graffiti writing.” (citations omitted)).
29
See Anna Almendrala, Street Art vs. Graffiti in Los Angeles, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb.
2, 2011, 11:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/02/los-angeles-street-artvs-graffiti_n_816625.html#s233319&title=Street_Art_Has (describing street art fans as
“enthralled with these artists who would risk violence, fines and imprisonment just to put
up a piece of art”).
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tinue this tradition today. Shepard Fairey originally rose to fame
through his OBEY campaign, where he and his friends posted
stickers across many major cities with a picture of the late Andre
the Giant and the word “OBEY” emblazoned on the sticker.30 The
campaign started in 1989 as a joke and continues to this day.31 It
uses ridiculous imagery and messaging to elicit amusement and
make people think about “the advertising and marketing that people ingest every day in our consumption-driven society.”32 Thus,
Fairey sees his work as an exercise in reclaiming public space for
the public by satirizing the commercialization of public space.33
Fairey is also no stranger to political satire, engaging in an artistic/advertising back-and-forth on a Rhode Island billboard during a
political campaign.34 Fairey’s work can be found in and “on” cities
in the United States, Tokyo, Hong Kong, London, and Barcelona.35
Banksy, another popular street artist, is probably the most famous street artist alive. Banksy has been active for the past two
decades,36 leaving his work across Europe, the Middle East, and
the United States. While Banksy shrouds his identity in mystery,37
his art is ironically among the most well known in the world.
Banksy’s influence and fame was most recently on display during
his month-long visit to New York City, where he displayed a new
piece of street art every day for thirty-one days.38 Banksy’s fans and
detractors39 all flocked around the city in October 2013 on a “scav30

Stephens, supra note 11, at 21–22.
Id. at 21.
32
Id. at 26.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 25–26.
35
Id. at 21.
36
STEVE WRIGHT, RICHARD JONES & TREVOR WYATT, BANKSY’S BRISTOL: HOME
SWEET HOME 32 (2007).
37
Stephens, supra note 11, at 39–40 (describing two of Banksy’s “friends” that did not
even know Banksy’s identity).
38
See generally Roberta Smith, Mystery Man, Painting the Town: Banksy Makes New York
His Gallery for a Month, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/
31/arts/design/banksy-makes-new-york-his-gallery-for-a-month.html; Cara Buckley,
Monthlong Chase Around New York City for Banksy’s Street Art, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/nyregion/monthlong-chase-around-newyork-city-for-banksys-street-art.html.
39
See Buckley, supra note 38 (quoting Tiffton Meares’ description of Banksy as “a
fraud”).
31
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enger hunt”40 of sorts, trying to find Banksy’s works before they
were stolen, defaced, covered up, or removed by property owners.41 The irony of Banksy’s campaign against commercialization of
public space is that he has risen to such fame that his work is worth
hundreds of thousands of dollars.42 Property owners are usually
very happy to be gifted with Banksy’s illegal work on their wall or
building.43 This is because they know that a Banksy work will raise
their property value and increase foot traffic in and around their
businesses.44 Many property owners put up plexiglass to ensure
that others do not deface their new asset.45 Property owners have
also opted to remove the portion of the wall upon which the Banksy
work is attached to sell the piece at high-end art galleries.46
40

See BANKSY DOES NEW YORK (HBO Documentary Films 2014) (chronicling all 31
days and quoting several people describing finding Banksy’s street art as a scavenger
hunt).
41
Several of the paintings were painted over by property owners, or if removable, were
removed by the property owners. For example, Banksy’s writing on a door was promptly
removed by property owners. His stencil on a metal gate was also sawed off with power
tools and stored, and a new gate was put up. See id.
42
Nishu Kakkar, 12 Most Expensive Banksy Art, MOST EXPENSIVE JOURNAL,
http://most-expensive.com/banksy-art (last visited May 11, 2015).
43
See BANKSY DOES NEW YORK, supra note 40 (chronicling property owners thanking
Banksy for leaving art on their property, and nearby property owners taking steps to
protect the Banksy work).
44
See, e.g., Banksy Graffiti Doubles Derelict Pub’s Value, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 2, 2008,
12:39 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/houseprices/3541901/
Banksy-graffiti-doubles-derelict-pubs-value.html (“The Whitehouse pub was originally
estimated by local estate agents to be worth some £495,000, but its value has now doubled
to around £1 million, as art dealers scurry to get their hands on it.”); see also Laughing All
the Way to the Banksy, SUN (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/
features/3187949/Banksy-graffiti-can-push-up-property-price.html (describing a Banksy
mural raising the property value of a seaside hotel by £150,000); Mark Duell & Sam
Creighton, Banksy That Appeared On A House Overnight And Tripled Its Value! Graffiti
Mural Featuring Spies In Trench Coats Is Painted On Wall Of Semi-Detached Home Near
GCHQ, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 13, 2014, 1:21 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2603782/Banksy-art-work-showing-government-agents-spying-phone-box-appears-Chel
tenham-house-near-GCHQ.html (describing recent Banksy art as raising a home’s
property value).
45
See Buckley, supra note 38 (describing several property owners protecting Banksy
pieces by putting sheets of glass over the work, or hiring security guards to watch over it.
This is done for good reason, considering that within hours of being sited, a tagger
defaced a Banksy image of geishas on a bridge).
46
See Kudler, supra note 3 (describing how many property owners choose to remove
the portion of their property, be it a wall, door, or gate, and sell it on the open market for
an enormous profit).
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Banksy’s three-dimensional works are often stolen by the public
and commodified in the same way.47 Perhaps this too is part of
Banksy’s social commentary; in this light, property owners and the
public add a “performance art” aspect to Banksy’s work, showing
the great lengths people are willing to go for a payday.
Despite the growing influence of street art as an accepted art
form and the potential positive benefits that street art can bring to
property values, local governments continue to stamp out this
means of expression48 by labeling it as vandalism in an effort to protect property rights.
II. COUNTER TO THE COUNTERCULTURE – STREET ART
ORDINANCES
Graffiti is not art. It’s just a senseless thing to do. The
random tagging of someone’s property without their
permission, that’s damage to property. That has nothing
to do with art. It’s a crime. It shouldn’t happen.
–Charles Williams, the current Streets and
Sanitation Commissioner for the city of Chicago49
While street art continues to fuel a subculture and excite popular culture,50 cities around the nation have met this popularity with
hardline policies to protect their communities. For example, Los
Angeles has codified one of the most anti-street art stances in order
to “protect public and private property from acts of vandalism and

47

Banksy’s Sphinx sculpture was stolen by nearby business owners and given to a highend art gallery in Southampton for sale. Banksy’s “Banksy Balloons” were also attempted
to be stolen when the culprits were caught by police. See BANKSY DOES NEW YORK, supra
note 40.
48
See generally Mettler, supra note 12 (arguing that street art is a means of expression,
and as such, should enjoy First Amendment protection from government censorship).
49
Ted Cox, Graffiti Removal Speeds Up as New Reports Decline, DNAINFO (Sept. 4,
2014, 10:56 AM), http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20140904/downtown/graffitiremoval-speeds-up-as-new-reports-decline.
50
See, e.g., Andrew Russeth, L.A. MOCA’s Street-Art Show Sets Attendance Record,
N.Y. OBSERVER (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.observer.com/2011/08/l-a-mocas-streetart-show-setsattendance-record (writing that the street art exhibition at Los Angeles’s
Museum of Contemporary Art, entitled “Art in the Streets,” set attendance records for
the museum, even surpassing its Andy Warhol retrospective in 2002).
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defacement.”51 These ordinances do not discriminate between art
forms, treating gang tagging and street art as two types of the same
social problem.52 As a result, Los Angeles prohibits persons from
marking53 public or private property;54 it also prohibits property
owners and lessees to permit, allow, or otherwise commission graffiti works on their property.55 The mere possession of aerosol graffiti and markers are prohibited within public facilities and parks.56
Additionally, store owners that sell such art supplies must display
the supplies in a way that requires employee assistance to facilitate
customer access.57 Violation of these laws carries civil penalties58 of
up to $1,000 per violation.59

51

L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.1(E) (2014).
See, e.g., id. § 49.84.2(A), (E) read as follows:
(A) “Act of graffiti” means an act which causes any form of
unauthorized inscription, word, figure or design to be marked,
etched, scratched, drawn, sprayed, painted or otherwise affixed on
any structural component of any building, structure or other facility
or upon any other property, regardless of its content or nature and
regardless of the nature of the material of that structural component
or property.
...
(E) “Graffiti” means any form of unauthorized inscription, word,
figure or design which is marked, etched, scratched, drawn, sprayed,
painted or otherwise affixed to or on any surface of public or private
property, including but not limited to, buildings, walls, signs,
structures or places, or other surfaces, regardless of the nature of the
material of that structural component.
See also Ted Cox, Graffiti Fines More than Doubled by Chicago City Council Committee,
DNAINFO (July 24, 2014, 2:11 PM), http://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20140724/down
town/graffiti-fines-more-than-doubled-by-chicago-city-council-committee (reporting that
Chicago aldermen “said that gang graffiti and nongang related tagging were equal
problems, although to varying extents in areas across the city”).
53
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.3(A) (2014) (prohibiting “any person
to write, paint, spray, chalk, etch, or otherwise apply graffiti”).
54
Id.
55
Id. § 49.84.3(B).
56
Id. § 49.84.5(A).
57
Id. § 49.84.4(A)–(B); see also S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 42, § 4201 (2014).
58
Some cities, such as New York, punish street art with misdemeanor and felony
charges. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00, 145.05, 145.10, and 145.60 (McKinney 2014).
59
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, §49.84.12 (2014).
52
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When these tools of deterrence do not prove effective,60 the
city can come onto private property, with the owner’s consent,61
and remove the street art at the city’s expense.62 Such consent,
however, is merely a formality because the city can enter the property and commence removal of the street art regardless of the
property owner’s consent;63 to add insult to injury, the city also
reserves the right to charge the property owner for such nonconsensual removal.64 The city can even charge the property owner
with a misdemeanor and charge the owner $1,000 every day he
does not comply.65 This scheme undoubtedly persuades many
property owners to consent to the city’s removal of street art solely
to protect themselves from carrying the cost of removal.66
Los Angeles is only one of a growing number of major cities67
and smaller communities68 adopting such legislation.69 These cities
60
At least one piece of data suggests that cracking down and increasing fines on graffiti
vandalism has only a small effect on deterrence. See Cox, supra note 49 (reporting that
doubling fines for graffiti vandalism in Chicago has resulted in “81,703 graffiti-removal
requests through August this year [2014], down from 92,980 over the same time last year.
At the same time, city crews have removed 82,858 pieces of graffiti through August this
year, closer to the 91,821 removed at this time a year ago.”).
61
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.7(B)(4), (C) (2014).
62
Id. § 49.84.7(A)–(B).
63
Id. § 49.84.8(A). This section applies to vacant property. However, subsection (B),
which applies to occupied property, also allows the City to enter the property to remove
the street art regardless of the property owner’s consent pursuant to section 91.8903.3.1
of the L.A. Municipal Code.
64
Id. § 49.84.8(A).
65
Id. § 49.84.12; see also id. § 49.84.10(A) (imposing administrative fines for
noncompliance). Also of note is that this regulatory scheme has an administrative hearing
process in which those found to be in violation of the ordinances can enjoy a hearing. See
id. § 49.84.10(E).
66
New York, on the other hand, requires its property owners to remove graffiti on
their premises at their own cost and imposes penalties for noncompliance. See N.Y.C.,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-117.3 (2014).
67
See, e.g., ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCES pt. II, ch. 74, art. V, § 74–174 (2014); BOS.,
MASS., MUN. CODE ch. XVI, § 16–8.5 (2013); MIAMI, FLA., ORDINANCES pt. II, ch. 37, §§
37–2(f)–(g) (2014); SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 5, art. 4, div. 4, §§ 54.0405(b)–
.0407 (2014); S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE art. 23, § 1304(a) (2014); N.Y.C., N.Y.,
ADMIN. CODE §§ 10-117(a)–(d) (2014).
68
See, e.g., YPSILANTI, MICH., ORDINANCES pt. II, ch. 42, art. II, § 42–46(c) (Supp.
2011); In re Carney, 621 Pa. 476, 482 (2013) (describing a local judge’s participation in the
Anti-Graffiti Task Force in the city of Eerie, Pennsylvania).
69
This Article does not seek to catalogue all local government ordinances relating to
graffiti in this country. Such a catalogue of what may be hundreds of ordinances is outside
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often rely on the same reasoning to justify their laws: street art is a
public nuisance70 because it lowers property values; it leads to violence, crime, and gang activity; and it creates fear and insecurity in
the community.71 However, emerging data is beginning to demonstrate how differently street art affects real estate values than does
graffiti.
Regarding crime, while empirical data does support findings
that the presence of graffiti has a snowball effect that raises crime
rates,72 it does not necessarily correlate to street art. Studies have
shown that “disorderly physical surroundings,” such as graffiti,
have a signaling effect that the neighborhood or environment is
“poorly maintained.” These signals can be perceived as a welcome
mat to criminals and increase the fear of crime.73 At least some police officials, however, have the intellectual honesty to admit that
gang tagging tends to incite more crime and violence than graffiti
unrelated to gangs.74 Additionally, many community organizations
exist to protect commissioned street art because of its positive effects on their community; such organizations argue that the community should decide how to handle the art it harbors, not the government.75
Regarding property values, legislatures likely lump graffiti in
with the effects of crime and social decay when linking street art to
lower property values. In a national study commissioned by the
the scope of this Article. Rather, this Article only seeks to offer the reader an introduction
into this legislative landscape.
70
See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.6 (2014) (declaring that
graffiti was considered a public nuisance).
71
See, e.g., id. § 49.84.1; S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE art. 23 § 1303(a) (2014).
72
Common sense might persuade people to reject the Broken Windows Theory, that
increased crime and gang activity is what actually causes an increase in graffiti and street
art, and not the other way around. But see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
73
Ariane L. Bedimo-Rung, Ph.D., et al., The Significance of Parks to Physical Activity and
Public Health: A Conceptual Model, 28 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 159, 164 (2005); see also
Kees Evert Keizer, The Spreading of Disorder, 322 SCIENCE 1681–85, no. 5908 (2008)
(finding that an area with graffiti caused twice as many people to engage in littering or
stealing when compared to behaviors in the same area without graffiti).
74
See Cox, supra note 49 (reporting that Chicago Police Commander William Dunn
generally stated “that gang graffiti was more likely to lead to street violence [than
nongang related tagging], making its removal a necessity”).
75
Bougdanos, supra note 13, at 549 (referring to the Social and Public Art Resource
Center).
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U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1992, researchers were unable
to “compile any reliable data” that showed that graffiti directly related to a “decline in the value of real property.”76 As has already
been argued above, the work of famous street artists can actually
raise property values.77 Further, there is a growing trend in real estate of commissioned street art correlating to increased property
values in major cities.78
The inconsistent reasoning of cities that have adopted antistreet art campaigns79 leads one to believe that there must be another underlying reason for such a hard-lined stance: money. Painting over street art is quite costly; perhaps this is what really justifies
street art ordinances in the eyes of the legislature. Major cities like
Los Angeles80 and Chicago81 are hit the hardest, dedicating millions
76

HARRIET H. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., VANDALISM: RESEARCH, PREVENTION, AND
SOCIAL POLICY 165 (1992) (finding that graffiti caused indirect costs of “decline in the
value of real property in areas infested by graffiti.” However, the author admitted that he
or she has “been unable to compile any reliable data for [these] indirect costs.”).
77
See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. Former mayor of New York, Michael
Bloomberg, disagrees, stating that Banksy and street art in general “does ruin people’s
property.” See also John Swaine, Banksy ‘Ruining People’s Property,’ Says Michael
Bloomberg, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 18, 2013, 6:13 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/northamerica/usa/10389870/Banksy-ruining-peoples-property-says-MichaelBloomberg.html. However, Shepard Fairey actually denounces street art that lowers
property value, and encourages other artists “to use public property, such as the sides of
buildings, street signs, billboards, and poles, or private property, only when it has been
abandoned or lies vacant.” Stephens, supra note 11, at 27.
78
See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 17 (finding that illegal street art can contributes to
gentrification and increase property values in places like SoHo, which have low instances
of crime); see also Alanna Weismann, Street Art Contributes to Property Values,
Neighborhood Character in Chelsea, MIDTOWN GAZETTE (Oct. 8, 2014, 4:03 PM),
http://themidtowngazette.com/2014/10/street-art-contributes-to-property-values-neigh
borhood-character-in-chelsea/ (finding that commissioned street art in the Manhattan
neighborhood of Chelsea increases property values); Bill Kearney, How Wynwood Earned
Its Street Cred, OCEAN DRIVE, http://oceandrive.com/living/articles/how-graffititransformed-miamis-wynwood-neighborhood (last visited May 11, 2015) (chronicling how
legal street art contributed to climbing property values in a once abandoned industrial
sector of Miami, FL).
79
See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-117.1 (2014) (establishing an Anti-Graffiti
Task Force in the city of New York).
80
Editorial, Cleaning Up Graffiti’s Act, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/ 2011/sep/04/opinion/la-ed-graffiti-20110904 (“Los Angeles
spent $7.1 million last year cleaning graffiti.”).
81
Hal Dardick & John Byrne, Alderman: Helen Keller Could See Graffiti Cancer in
Chicago, CHI. TRIB. (July 24, 2014, 3:35 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
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of dollars each year to removing street art. Consequently, it should
be no surprise why cities across the country consider street art a
nuisance—after all, it is a “cancer”82 that is costing them nearly
$12 billion every year to treat.83
The laws that many cities around the country have adopted
send a clear signal that street art is not welcome. These cities even
go so far as to categorize street art as a per se nuisance that justifies
trespassing on private property and destroying a potentially valuable asset of the property owner. These types of laws84 may “go too
far”85 to be deemed constitutional under existing Supreme Court
precedent of the Takings Clause and its underlying principles.
III.

AN UNCERTAIN WORLD – TAKINGS CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
Under our notions of what constitutes property, I have a
real problem with the idea that a piece of property—
which is ultimately what a work of art is—cannot be
treated as other pieces of property by the owner of it. And
that poses some serious constitutional problems.86

local/politics/chi-city-graffiti-crackdown-20140724-story.html (“This year, the city [of
Chicago] is spending $4.9 million on graffiti removal . . . .”).
82
See id. (quoting a Chicago Alderman describing street art as a cancer that even a
blind person could recognize).
83
Deborah Lamm Weisel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Problem-Oriented Guides for Police
Problem-Specific Guides Series No. 9, Graffiti 2 (Aug. 2004), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/
pdf/e11011354.pdf (“[A]n estimated $12 billion a year is spent cleaning up graffiti in the
United States.”).
84
Consider also Los Angeles’s very strict sign regulations, which “essentially
prohibit[] all murals, even those commissioned by property owners.” Mettler, supra note
12 (citing L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. I, art. 4.4, § 14.4.4(B)(10)) (detailing Los Angeles’s
sign regulations, which would apply to murals and other street art, unless they contained
writing).
85
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
86
Eric Felton, New Law Gives Rights to Artists After Work is Sold, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1990, at F2 (quoting lawyer). This particular critic is weary of artists having rights after
they transfer ownership of their art to a buyer. This would restrict the buyer from using
his art as he sees fit, and may result in a constitutional taking. See generally Chintan Amin,
Keep Your Filthy Hands Off My Painting! The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 and the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 315 (1997) (analyzing the Visual Rights Act
of 1990 (“VARA”) under the Takings Clause). This logic is also uniquely applicable to
the inquiry of this Article; even though the critic is not directly addressing a property
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The rocky road that the Supreme Court has taken to understand the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is one that has inspired many constitutional scholars’ study and has even caused
many laypersons to doubt the Court’s intentions.87 The muddled88
doctrines have created an uncertain landscape that has diminished
predictability in governments’ assertion of their eminent domain
and police powers. Nevertheless, in order to appreciate the question posed in this Article and to find a solution, the difficult terrain
of Takings Clause jurisprudence must be traversed.
Analysis of any legal authority should start with a plain reading
of its text.89 The Takings Clause states “nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”90 “Thus,
owner’s right to control the uncommissioned art on his property, nonetheless a
restriction on the property owner’s right to do what he sees fit with his property does
pose “constitutional problems” that this Article seeks to explore.
87
Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38
URB. LAW. 201 (2006) (describing a large number of Americans as “dismayed and
angered” in the aftermath of Kelo v. City of New London, 544 U.S. 469 (2005), and that
public opinion polls showed Americans’ widespread opposition to the decision (citing
Paul Shigley, Backlash Threatens Redevelopment: Eminent Domain Ruling Sparks
Legislation, Calls for Reform; State Legislation, 20 CAL. PLAN. & DEV. REP. 1 (2005))).
88
See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 561, 562–63, 594–96 (1984) (characterizing Takings Clause doctrine as a
“muddle”); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2004) (describing
takings jurisprudence as being unable to be “characterized as unified”).
89
Such analysis should not necessarily finish at its text. This is especially true for such
a short and vague clause as the Takings Clause of which there is virtually no discussion in
the Constitutional Convention debates. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 423 (1st ed. 1968); Eben
Moglin, The Privilege in British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth Amendment,
in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 109,
138 (Helmholtz et al., eds., 1997) (describing that Framers did not engage in any floor
debate when drafting or adopting the Fifth Amendment. Neither did the Amendment’s
drafter, James Madison, leave any thoughts or discourses on the matter.).
90
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The full Amendment reads as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
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government action that works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates the ‘constitutional obligation to pay just compensation.’”91 This means that the Takings Clause is not meant to interfere with the government’s ability to take property, but rather to
secure compensation for a property owner when their property is
taken.92
Takings Clause doctrine is best understood as divided between
three inquiries. First, there is the Takings Inquiry. This is the most
doctrinally complex of the three, in which courts determine whether a taking has occurred.93 Second is the Public Use Inquiry. After
it has been established that a taking has occurred, the constitutionality of such a taking must meet the standard of being for a public
use. Third is the Just Compensation Inquiry. This step determines
the amount of compensation due to a property owner based on the
valuation of his taken property.
A. Takings Inquiry
The obscure puzzle of the Takings Inquiry becomes more lucid
when differentiating between two types of takings: physical takings
and regulatory takings.94 A physical taking is exactly as it sounds; it
The placement of the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment is a curious decision of its
drafter, James Madison. The Takings Clause seems out of place among what are
understood as rights of criminal defendants. Perhaps the context of the Takings Clause is
easiest explained by the preceding Due Process Clause, which protects against the
deprivation of “life, liberty, or property”; understandably, the more specific deprivation
of private property seems to flow naturally from the broader Due Process Clause.
91
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
92
James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Another Step in the Right Direction, 25
ENVTL. L. 143, 145 n.18 (1995).
93
Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II—
Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CALIF. L.
REV. 55, 56–57 (1990) (“One of the most intractable and significant problems facing the
Supreme Court today is the task of determining when governmental action that causes
economic injury to private parties constitutes a compensable “taking” under the Takings
Clause of the fifth amendment.” Peterson describes “four different tests” that the Court
has used in the Takings Inquiry, which I have outlined below).
94
See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992) (“Most of our cases
interpreting the Clause fall within two distinct classes. Where the government authorizes
a physical occupation of property (or actually takes title), . . . [and] where the government
merely regulates the use of property . . . .”); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe
Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002) (describing the “longstanding
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generally applies to the government’s exercise of eminent domain
to take physical property.95 However, physical takings can also apply to physical invasions of private property caused by government
actors.96 A regulatory taking is different insofar as the government
does not take ownership or invade physical property, but instead
exercises its police power to regulate how a property owner uses
his property.97
In order to determine if a taking has occurred, different but related tests apply to each type of taking. As this Article explores below, there are identifiable underlying principles that bind these
substantially different types of takings together. These underlying
principles help inform the predictability of Takings Clause jurisprudence, which has sustained a history of doctrinal volatility.
The application of the Takings Clause was not always so difficult; since colonial times, the requirement of just compensation for
a government taking was understood to only apply to physical takings of property that resulted from the state’s exercise of its eminent domain power.98 While this power was primarily used for the
acquisition of real property for the building of public roads and
governmental buildings, it was also used to acquire chattel property
to contribute to building efforts or war efforts.99 The Takings
distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on the one hand, and
regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other” as being so distinct as to rely upon two
separate lines of precedent); S. Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of S. Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
649 n.15 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he attempt to differentiate ‘regulation’
from ‘taking’ [has been characterized] as ‘the most haunting jurisprudential problem in
the field of contemporary land-use law . . . one that may be the lawyer’s equivalent of the
physicist’s hunt for the quark.’” (quoting C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed.
1976))).
95
See Yee, 503 U.S. at 522.
96
See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
97
See Yee, 503 U.S. at 522.
98
See generally Michael R. Rappaport, Originalism and Regulatory Takings: Why the
Fifth Amendment May Not Protect Against Regulatory Takings, but the Fourteenth
Amendment May, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (2008) (arguing that the original Takings
Clause as adopted in the Fifth Amendment does not support regulatory takings, but only
physical takings. However, the adoption and incorporation of the Takings Clause through
the Fourteenth Amendment expanded its application as applied to the states, allowing it
to include regulatory takings.).
99
Ely, supra note 5, at 4, 12–13 (1992) (noting that during colonial times, several states
took land and supplies for building roads and bridges, and for taking supplies during the
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Clause itself did not start to enjoy frequent considerations by the
Court until the late 1800s; when it was interpreted, it applied to
physical takings of real property.100 Around the turn of the century,
however, things began to change.
1. Regulatory Takings
Determining when a regulatory taking has occurred is an elusive inquiry because of the lack of practical rules. In the Court’s
attempt to determine when “a regulation goes too far”101 so as to
constitute a taking,102 it has admitted that it has “eschewed any
‘set formula’ for determining how far is too far.”103 Instead, it relies on “ad hoc, factual inquiries” involving several factors.104
The dilemma began when the Court broadened the Takings
Clause in the late 1800s in cases like Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
Railroad Co. v. Chicago.105 Chicago involved the city of Chicago

Revolutionary War; payment was required for these takings). But see MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 63–64 (1977); William
M. Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1985) (arguing that the compensation principle
goes against the common practice of the revolutionary time period, where colonial
governments would take “without compensating the owner.”); Maureen Struab
Kordesh, “I Will Build My House With Sticks”: The Splintering of Property Interests Under
the Fifth Amendment May Be Hazardous to Private Property, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 397,
409–11 (1996).
100
See Lucas v. S.C. Coast Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (“Prior to Justice
Holmes’s exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, it was generally thought that the
Takings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property, . . . or the functional
equivalent of a ‘practical ouster of [the owner’s] possession.’” (alteration in original)
(citations omitted)).
101
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
102
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2004) (“The rub, of course,
has been—and remains—how to discern how far is ‘too far.’”).
103
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (1992) (“In 70-odd years of succeeding ‘regulatory takings’
jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any ‘set formula’ for determining how far is
too far, preferring to ‘engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’” (alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 174–75 (1979) (citation omitted); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594 (1962) (“There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking
begins.”).
104
Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 175 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
105
166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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condemning property to widen a street.106 A jury decided the proper amount of just compensation to be paid to several property owners, yet only awarded Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Company one dollar for the City’s taking of its right of way “to be
used for the purposes of the proposed street.”107 Thus, the issue
before the Court was that of just compensation due to the railroad
company’s diminished use of land, not the physical taking of land.
The Court slightly departed from its physical taking application of
the Takings Clause by finding that the railroad company was entitled to just compensation for the diminution in value of the land
caused by the encumbrance of “a perpetual right in the public to
use it for the purpose of a street.”108 The Court found that due
process, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment, required just
compensation for takings under the Constitution;109 ultimately, the
106

Id. at 230.
Id.
108
Id. at 233.
109
At least one scholar has suggested that Chicago should be categorized as a case that
contributes to due process jurisprudence, not Takings Clause law. See Bradley C.
Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings
“Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 843–52, 862–67 (2006). The research of this Article
has reached a different conclusion, which is also consistent with reigning Supreme Court
doctrine since Penn Central. While the Court employed the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to come to a decision in Chicago, this was merely the procedural
vehicle that was used to apply the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to the state of
Illinois. This conclusion is supported by the Court’s own statement:
Whatever may have been the power of the States on this subject prior
to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, it
seems clear that, since that amendment went into effect, such
limitations and restraints have been placed upon their power in
dealing with individual rights that the States cannot now lawfully
appropriate private property for the public benefit or to public uses
without compensation to the owner, . . . and that, without such
compensation, . . . no matter under what form of procedure it is
taken, would violate the provisions of the federal Constitution.
Chicago, 166 U.S. at 238–39 (quoting Scott v. Toledo, 36 F. 385, 395–96 (1888)).
Consequently, Chicago is cited by most Supreme Court precedent on takings as the case
that incorporated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, making it applicable to the states. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at
122; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994); Palazzo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 617
(2001); see also Rappaport, supra note 98, at 744 n.57 (“The incorporation of the Takings
Clause is usually thought to have occurred in [Chicago].”). But see Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384
n.5, 404–05 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Chicago is actually grounded in
“‘substantive due process,’ rather than in the view that the Takings Clause of the Fifth
107
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Court decided that the jury’s verdict sufficiently awarded just
compensation because the jury likely found that the railroad company’s use of its railroad across the proposed street would not be
damaged.110
While the fact pattern in Chicago is not completely analogous to
modern regulatory takings,111 it appears to be one of the first instances that the Court applied the Takings Clause to a government
action that affected a property owner’s use of his land.112 The
Court expanded on this logic in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,113
which is seen by many as the genesis of regulatory takings.114 In
Mahon, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Kohler Act, which
changed the status quo of coal mining property rights in the state.115
The Kohler Act significantly regulated the amount of coal that
mining companies (who had subterranean property rights) could
mine, and thus “destroy[ed] previously existing rights of property
and contract.”116 In determining whether the law constituted a taking of the coal companies’ property, the court considered “the extent of diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if
not all cases, there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
Amendment was made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But there
is no doubt that later cases have held that the Fourteenth Amendment does make the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States”).
110
Chicago, 166 U.S. at 242, 257–58.
111
Modern regulatory takings are usually not related to corresponding physical takings
of the government, as was the case in Chicago.
112
This Article does not argue that Chicago is the genesis of regulatory takings, but
merely that it represented a move in the Court’s understanding of the Takings Clause in a
broader light. In fact, the railroad company’s loss of certain rights to exclude the public
from traversing its property as part of a public street is more akin to a physical taking in
which a government action diminishes the owner’s right to exclude. See Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979).
113
260 U.S. 393 (1992).
114
See Jeffrey A. Wilcox, Taking Cover: Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence as a Tool
for Resolving Water Disputes in the American West, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 490 (2003)
(“Mahon reflected the Court’s first explicit recognition that though all regulation affects
property rights, there is a point at which the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is
triggered despite the regulation being a legitimate exercise of police power”); Peter L.
Henderer, The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and the Logically
Antecedent Question: A Practitioner’s Guide to Fifth Amendment Takings of Wetlands, 3
ENVTL. LAW. 407, 412–13 n.25 (1997).
115
See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
116
Id. at 412.
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compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends on the
particular facts.”117 Although the requisite amount of diminution
was not fleshed out by the Court, it ultimately held that the Kohler
Act was a taking that required just compensation because it “affect[ed] the mining of coal . . . where the right to mine such coal
has been reserved.”118 The Court saw this ruling as a necessary
check on the police power of the state, which had the potential to
be extended to such lengths to be a dangerous threat to private
property.119 Realizing the need to curb this danger to a free society,120 the court handed down “[t]he general rule . . . that, while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far, it will be recognized as a taking.”121
Unfortunately, determining when a “regulation goes too far” is
not an easy task. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York122 was one of the Court’s attempts to do just that. The Penn
Central Transportation Company, which owned the iconic Grand
Central Terminal in New York City, wanted to construct a multistory office building on top of the famous train station;123 however,
because the terminal was deemed a “landmark” by the recently
created New York Land Preservation Commission, Penn Central

117

Id. at 413; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
119
“The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is
wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without
compensation . . . . When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by
the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification
more and more, until at last private property disappears.” Id. at 415. On the other hand,
the Court also recognized that there was a spectrum of the use of police powers by stating
that “[g]overnment could hardly go on if, to some extent, values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long
recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation, and must yield to the
police power.” Id. at 413. Thus, Mahon was probably the Court’s best attempt at the time
to strike the right balance between protecting property rights, and allowing the
government enough room to function efficiently.
120
See Huffman, supra note 92, at 146 (“The takings clause exists, along with the rest of
the Bill of Rights, because the constitutional framers understood the inevitability of the
tyranny of the majority in an unlimited democracy.” (citing James Madison, THE
FEDERALIST No. 10)).
121
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added).
122
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
123
Id. at 112.
118
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had to have its plans approved.124 When the Commission rejected
its development plans, Penn Central sued arguing that the denial of
building the office structure, which would potentially result in large
lease revenues, was an unconstitutional taking of its right to develop its property.125 The Court developed a three-factor test to analyze whether a regulatory scheme was a taking “by engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors—such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the
character of the governmental action.”126 The Court ultimately
found that New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law did not
amount to a regulatory taking because the restrictions did not “interfere in any way with the present use of the Terminal . . . . So the
law does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.”127
Thus, Penn Central could still use the Terminal as it originally expected to in an economically beneficial way.128 Such a result was
not “of such a magnitude that ‘there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain [it].’”129
Next, the Court seemed to informally abandon the three Penn
Central factors in Agins v. City of Tiburon,130 in which the Court favored a revamped two-factor approach.131 Agins involved a munici124

Id. at 117.
Penn Central is the quintessential regulatory takings case: a government regulation
has affected a property owner’s ability to use their land as they see fit, thus “taking” the
owner’s property rights as well as economic benefit.
126
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (quoting Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 124).
127
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136. The Court also reasoned that the petitioner in Penn
Central still retained the value of its air rights for the airspace above the Terminal;
however, this holding is less important to the crux of this Article.
128
Thus, the Court’s logic in finding that there was no regulatory taking rested
primarily on the “investment-backed expectation” prong. The three-part test was never
meant to be a mechanical checklist of elements, but more of an inquiry of balancing,
where the three factors are weighed to determine when a regulation or law “goes too far.”
Because investment-backed expectations were not affected at all, this factor alone was
able to tip the scale in the direction that the regulation did not constitute a taking.
129
Id. at 136 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)) (alteration in
original).
130
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
131
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987)
(“The two factors that the Court considered relevant, have become integral parts of our
125
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pal zoning ordinance put into effect after petitioners had acquired
five acres of land.132 As a result of the ordinance that restricted use
of the land to “one-family dwellings,” the petitioners were no
longer able to develop the land and build more lucrative residences.133 The Court dictated its two-part rule134 for regulatory takings:
a law “effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”135 Consequently, because the Court
found that the zoning ordinance fulfilled the legitimate state goal of
“discourage[ing] the ‘premature and unnecessary conversion of
open-space land to urban uses,’”136 the ordinance was not deemed
a taking.
Notwithstanding the thick doctrinal conflict at the time, the
Court did simplify the Takings Inquiry by establishing a per se rule
in regulatory takings in Lucas v. South Carolina Coast Council.137
The per se rule established in Lucas dictates that a taking will be
found when a regulation calls upon an owner “to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses”138 of his property.139 Lucas, the petitionTakings Clause analysis. We have held that land use regulation can effect a taking if it
‘does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, . . . or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land.’” (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260)).
132
Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
133
Id. at 258. As a result, the petitioners “contended, the city had ‘completely
destroyed the value of [appellants’] property for any purpose or use whatsoever . . . .” Id.
(alterations in original) (citations omitted).
134
Perhaps themselves realizing the tumultuousness of Takings Clause law as it then
stood, the Court admitted that “no precise rule determines when property has been
taken.” Id. at 260–61 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 164 (1979)).
135
Id. at 260 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978)). While these factors seem
distinctly different from the three Penn Central factors, they should rather be understood
as a modification. The first Agins factor—denial of economically viable use of land—is
really a combination of the “economic impact” and “investment backed-expectation”
factors in Penn Central. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485, 493 (citing the Agins and Penn
Central as authority for the application of the two Agins factors, then analyzing the
“Diminution of Value and Investment-Backed Expectations” as part of its two part Agins
analysis, even though these factors more closely correspond with the factors in Penn
Central). The second Agins factor—the substantial advancement of a legitimate state
interest—is actually a modification of the “character of the government action” factor in
Penn Central.
136
Id. at 261 (quoting CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65561(b) (West Supp. 1979)).
137
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
138
Id. at 1019.
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ing property owner, bought two residential lots on a South Carolina
beach where he intended to build single family homes and render a
substantial profit.140 This investment was dashed when South Carolina enacted a law that prevented all development activities in
“coastal zones” in order to prevent erosion of beachfront land.141
Upon the finding that the law had rendered Lucas’s property valueless,142 the Court found that a taking had occurred because Lucas’s investment-backed expectations to build single-family homes
on his property had been destroyed.143 Thus, the severity of the
law’s economic impact and destruction of Lucas’s investmentbacked expectations of the future use of his land led the Court to
conclude that a taking had occurred.
This per se rule, however, most readily applied to laws that
permanently robbed an owner of all economical use of his land.
Additionally, a regulation that temporarily robbed a property owner
of all economic value was also considered by the Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles.144 In First
English, Los Angeles County passed an interim ordinance that prevented development of land that had recently been devastated by
flooding in the Angeles National Forest.145 The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church challenged the ordinance; the Church
139

See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2004) (describing the Lucas
rule as establishing “per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes”). However, this
understanding of Lucas may not be correct considering the following language of the
Court: “Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry
into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part
of his title to begin with.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. Thus, the Court is saying that even
when a government action strips all economically beneficial use of land from its owner, it
is still possible that such an action would not constitute a taking if the owner’s
investment-backed expectations were not affected.
140
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008.
141
Id.
142
The Court relied upon the state trial court’s determination that the land was
“valueless.” Id. at 1006, 1009.
143
Id. at 1027, 1031–32.
144
482 U.S. 304 (1987). Temporary takings had been considered before in
Massachusetts during colonial times, “[w]here lawmakers required the payment of
damages for an interim taking of land as part of a flood control project where temporary
dams would be built to [f]acilitate the removal of obstructions.” Ely, supra note 5, at 13.
145
First English, 482 U.S. at 307.
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owned land in the area and lost several buildings to the flood.146
Thus, the ordinance deprived them of the economic use of this
land by precluding them from reconstructing the buildings and reestablish their activities there.147 Because of the procedural posture
of the case, the Takings Inquiry was not before the Court; instead,
the Court assumed a taking had occurred and answered the Just
Compensation Inquiry by stating that the “Just Compensation
Clause requires the government to pay for ‘temporary’ regulatory
takings.”148
First English, however, was largely abrogated when the Takings
Inquiry was before the Court in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.149 In Tahoe, a temporary moratorium was enacted on building and development on certain land surrounding Lake Tahoe in California and Nevada. The Court reasoned that such a temporary restriction merely caused a diminution
in value, and could not render the estate valueless because the value would return once the restriction was lifted.150 While the court
still left open the possibility that a temporary regulatory taking
could be a taking,151 it is difficult to imagine one that is so invasive
that it makes up for its own temporary nature.
In the years after Lucas, the Court has largely solved its doctrinal conflict152 between Penn Central and Agins. While the Agins test
has been cited multiple times in regulatory takings cases,153 the
court abrogated Agins in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.154 Lingle clearly
laid out the Court’s rule of law by stating that Lucas was a per se
146

Id. at 308.
Id.
148
Id. at 313 (footnote omitted).
149
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
150
Id. at 332.
151
Id.at 337 (“[W]e do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction
precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given
exclusive significance one way or the other.”).
152
The conflict is only doctrinal, as the black letter law seemingly conflicts; in practice,
the factors essentially lead to the same outcomes because of their similarities. See supra
note 137.
153
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n,
483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
154
544 U.S. 528 (2004).
147
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test that was determinative of the Takings Inquiry in regulatory
takings;155 when a case fell short of meeting the “sacrifice [of] all
economically beneficial uses” articulated in Lucas, the Penn Central
factors were the appropriate determinatives of the Takings Inquiry.156
2. Physical Takings
Physical takings represent the traditional view of takings as understood until the turn of the century.157 The standard procedure
for such a taking begins with the government’s commencement of
condemnation proceedings; after such commencement, the government and property owner enter into negotiations, and sometimes litigate to decide the Just Compensation Inquiry. This usually provides a straightforward application of the law: “Where the
government authorizes a physical occupation of property (or actually takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires compensation.”158 However, situations arise where the government believes
its physical occupation or invasion does not constitute a taking, and
the property owner must himself commence inverse condemnation
proceedings to solve the Takings Inquiry.159

155

Id. at 538.
Id. at 538–39 (“[R]egulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set
forth in Penn Central . . . .”); see also Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 511, 518, 521 (2012). See generally Wilcox, supra note 114 (an example of pre-Lingle
scholarship advocating for a return to the Penn Central factors to govern regulatory
takings in light of the Court’s inconsistent precedent).
157
See Rappaport, supra note 98, at 736 (citing Treanor, supra note 99, at 791 n.50)
(arguing that the original application of state takings clauses at the time of the adoption of
the Fifth Amendment “suggest that the Federal Takings Clause was understood as
extending only to physical takings, since the state and federal clauses used similar
language”).
158
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992) (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)); see also Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124
(“A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.” (citation omitted)).
159
See generally, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 511; Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
156
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For example, the government did not believe its actions constituted a taking in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.160 In Kaiser, petitioners created a marina by dredging and filling a pond, thereby
connecting it to a publicly owned bay and the Pacific Ocean.161 As a
result of this newly created marina’s connection to publicly held
waters, the government asserted that the public had a right to enter
the waters of the marina because the connection of these waters
made the once-private pond a “navigable water[] of the United
States,” to which citizens enjoy access.162 The Court deemed such
an action of the government as tantamount to a physical taking because “the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context
will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina.”163 Such an invasion, even though only amounting to an
easement, nevertheless deprived the petitioning owners of one of
the most fundamental rights of private property: the right to exclude.164 Thus, the Court held that “even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless
pay just compensation.”165
The Court relied upon its logic in Kaiser when establishing a per
se rule166 for physical takings in Loretto v. Telemprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.167 Loretto involved a New York statute that required
landowners to permit cable television companies to install its
CATV cables and directional taps upon their property.168 Even
160

444 U.S. 164 (1979).
Id. at 166–67.
162
Id. at 168–69.
163
Id. at 180.
164
See id. at 180 n.11 (“As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, ‘[a]n essential element of
individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting))); see also infra Part II.A.3.b and accompanying notes.
165
Id.; see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841–42 (1987) (finding
that the government’s imposition of a permanent public easement across a private beach
constituted a taking).
166
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2004) (describing the holding
in Loretto as a precedent that established a per se taking rule).
167
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
168
Id. at 421–22 (“[The cable company] installed a cable slightly less than one-half inch
in diameter and of approximately 30 feet in length along the length of the building about
18 inches above the roof top, and directional taps, approximately 4 inches by 4 inches by 4
inches, on the front and rear of the roof. By June 8, 1970 the cable had been extended
161
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though the installation of such discreet cables and equipment was
minimal, the Court found that the law nonetheless constituted a
taking because a government’s imposition of a permanent occupation on a property owner’s property effectively destroys the owner’s right to “‘possess, use, and dispose of [the property].’”169
Therefore, no matter how small the physical invasion might be,
such property rights of owners will always be affected, and consequently, always effect a taking.
Like in Lucas, an important part of the Loretto per se rule is the
permanent physical occupation of property; temporary physical occupations or invasions “are subject to a more complex balancing
process to determine whether they are a taking.”170 The Court
clarified this when citing to Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,171
in which “the Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that
shopping center owners permit individuals to exercise free speech
and petition rights on their property, to which they had already invited the general public.”172 In its attempt to weigh appropriate factors, the Court noted that because the invasion of unwanted persons “was temporary and limited in nature, and since the owner
had not exhibited an interest in excluding all persons from his
property ‘the fact that [the solicitors] may have ‘physically invaded’
[the owners’] property cannot be viewed as determinative.’”173 Thus,
Pruneyard was an example where the temporary abrogation of the
right to exclude was a factor, but not dispositive when considering
mitigating factors.
In no way did Loretto or Pruneyard foreclose on the possibility
of temporary physical occupations or invasions being considered as
takings; rather, the Court has a wealth of precedent from the
World War II era that holds the exact opposite. During the war, the
government temporarily condemned many properties, or otherwise
temporarily commandeered factories to produce much needed
another 4 to 6 feet and cable had been run from the directional taps to the adjoining
building at 305 West 105th Street.”).
169
Id. at 435 (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945));
see also infra Part II.A.3.b and accompanying notes.
170
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 435 n.12.
171
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
172
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434.
173
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 84) (footnote omitted).
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supplies for the war.174 This included the temporary seizure of
storage warehouses,175 a laundry facility,176 and the take-over of a
coal mine to prevent a national strike.177 While these cases actually
contemplated the government’s control over a physical structure
or operation on real property, the Court also found a taking when
government military aircraft flew at low altitudes over a dwelling
and chicken farm in United States v. Causby.178 This case involved
the military’s temporary use of a nearby airport. The Court found a
taking, even though there was no physical occupation; instead,
there was merely an invasion of noise and light.179 These indirect
invasions caused the owners to give up their chicken business and
heightened their anxiety.180 In essence, the Court found that the
low altitude fly-overs were tantamount to taking a fee interest
easement of the land, even though “enjoyment and use of the land
are not completely destroyed.”181
Most recently, the Court revisited the principles of temporary
physical takings in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United
States.182 Arkansas Game and Fish Commission involved the United
States Army Corps of Engineers’ periodic deviation from their Water Control Manual, which governed seasonal water release rates
from a dam they controlled in Arkansas.183 From 1993 through
2000, the Corps released less water from the dam to accommodate
farmers downstream, but in turn caused the loss of 18 million board
feet of lumber due to flooding on the Arkansas Game and Fish
Commission’s wooded property.184 Although the flooding would
174

See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519 (2012)
(outlining World War II precedent on temporary takings).
175
E.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U. S. 261, 267 (1950);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
176
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
177
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951). But see Nat’l Bd. of YMCA v.
United States, 395 U. S. 85, 93 (1969) (finding that the “temporary, unplanned
occupation” of building by troops under exigent circumstances was not a taking).
178
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
179
Id. at 259.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 262.
182
133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
183
Id. at 516.
184
Id. at 516–17.
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eventually recede each year, the Court found this temporary invasion of property caused by the Corps to be a taking to which just
compensation was due.185 After outlining extensive precedent on
past flooding cases and several cases of temporary physical takings,
the Court concluded that “government-induced flooding can constitute a taking of property, and because a taking need not be permanent to be compensable, our precedent indicates that government-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensable.”186
Doctrinally, the Court importantly clarified several relevant
factors it considers in temporary physical takings cases, including
the temporariness or permanence of the taking; whether “the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of . . . government action”; and the “severity of the interference.”187 As hinted at in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, these factors are highly analogous and track closely to the Penn Central factors applicable in regulatory takings.188
3. Underlying Principles
While the Court has attempted to clarify the Takings Inquiry in
the past decade, the Court’s turbulent applications of these tests
require a deeper inquiry into its reasoning and justifications for doing so. In many ways, the underlying principles that gird these differing factors are more useful to the student of Takings Clause law
than the more elusive “black letter” of the law.189

185

Id. at 519.
Id. But see Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S. 146, 149 (1924) (finding that to be
a taking, flooding must “constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting
to an appropriation of, and not merely an injury to, the property”).
187
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519–20.
188
“[A]side from the cases attended by [the per se rules of Loretto and Lucas], most
takings claims turn on situation-specific factual inquiries.” Id. at 518 (citing Penn Cent.
Transp. Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). This citation to Penn
Central almost hints that its three factors are determinative of all takings outside of the per
se rules, both physical and regulatory.
189
Peterson, supra note 93, at 161–62 (arguing that the Court’s Takings Clause
jurisprudence is not attributable to doctrine, but rather relies on their notions of fairness).
186
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a) One Unfairly and Unjustly Bearing the Cost for the
Community
One of the underlying principles of the Takings Clause “is to
bar [the] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.”190 Thus, the difficulty has come in determining
when the government’s imposition upon the property rights of an
individual property owner is so unfair and unjust to validate the
community’s compensation of that property owner.
This principle was expressly evoked191 in Agins, and is partly responsible for guiding the Court to its holding. In Agins, the Court’s
recognition that “[t]he determination that governmental action
constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at
large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest.”192 Consequently, because the zoning ordinance affected many property owners and did
not single out the petitioner’s five acres of land, the petitioner was
not asked to bear the burden of the exercise of state power on its
own;193 rather, the effects would naturally be spread out to the entire community.194 Thus, compensating the owners of a taking was
190

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); see also Ely, supra note 5, at 3 (“The rationale behind the
takings clause was that the financial burden of public policy should not be unfairly placed
on individual property owners but shared by the public as a whole.”).
191
The term “expressly evoked” is quite intentional because this bedrock principle
underlies all takings cases, even though it may not be mentioned. In fact, it is one of the
principles of fairness and justice upon which the Takings Clause is predicated upon.
192
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); see also Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467
U.S. 1 (1984) (“The principle that underlies [protecting investment-backed expectations]
is that, while most burdens consequent upon government action undertaken in the public
interest must be borne by individual landowners as concomitants of the advantage of
living and doing business in a civilized community, some are so substantial and
unforeseeable, and can so easily be identified and redistributed, that “justice and
fairness” require that they be borne by the public as a whole.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
193
Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
194
But see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987) (“If the
Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California’s attempt to remedy these
problems, although they had not contributed to it more than other coastal landowners, the
State’s action, even if otherwise valid, might violate either the incorporated Takings
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. One of the principal purposes of the Takings
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unnecessary to properly balance the government’s need with the
social and economic harm to the property owner.
This underlying principle was further explored by the Court in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,195 in which the
Court addressed another Pennsylvania law regulating coal mining,196 the Subsidence Act.197 The law empowered a state agency to
prevent coal miners from removing more than 50% of coal from
mines located beneath buildings in order to protect the public interest in having structural integrity of surface buildings.198 Citing
Agins, the Court recognized that a taking is usually found when the
public should bear the burden of a governmental exercise of power,
rather than a single property owner.199 The Court found that determining when this threshold is crossed “‘necessarily requires a
weighing of private and public interests.’”200 The Court’s conclusion that the Subsidence Act “plainly seeks to further” the public
interest of enjoying structural integrity201 was therefore enough to
Clause is to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954) (justifying a regulatory scheme targeting blight because no
single property owner bore the burden of the scheme alone, but rather the entire
community; “[i]f owner after owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment
programs on the ground that his particular property was not being used against the public
interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly”); Penn Cent. Transp.
Corp. v City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134 (finding that the property owner alone was
not burdened with the City’s landmarks law, but rather that “all the structures contained
in the 31 historical districts and over 400 individual landmarks” also bore the burden of
the regulatory scheme).
195
480 U.S. 470 (1987).
196
The Court recognized the similarities to Mahon, in which a taking was found to
occur when the Kohler Act regulated subterranean coal mining rights. Id. at 473; see also
supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text.
197
Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, 52 PA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1406.1–.21 (West 2014).
198
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 478–79.
199
Id. at 492.
200
Id.
201
The Court likened this public interest to those of preventing public nuisances. There
have been many cases where the Court has recognized that a taking does not occur when
the state is using its police power to prevent a public nuisance that is injurious to the
community. See id. at 489–91 (citing Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1926) (holding
that the Takings Clause did not require the State of Virginia to compensate the owners of
cedar trees when the state ordered them destroyed to prevent the spread of an
agricultural disease to a nearby apple orchard under nuisance doctrine); Euclid v. Amber

2015]

TAKING BACK THE STREETS?

719

outweigh the private economic interests of the coal companies,
who were still able to make a profit202 by mining coal.203 Thus, this
principle of fairly and justly distributing harm of government action
to the community as a whole is an important undercurrent in Takings Clause doctrine.
b) Property as a Bundle of Rights
The next important undercurrent is the Court’s recognition of
the impact that takings have on depriving owners of meaningful
sticks in their bundle of property rights. In Andrus v. Allard,204 a
law that prohibited the sale of eagle products was challenged by
Native American artifact dealers who sold eagle feathers.205 The
law was not deemed a taking since “there was no physical invasion
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88 (1926) (finding a zoning ordinance excluding industrial
establishments was constitutional under a nuisance theory and the proper use of police
power); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (finding no taking
occurred when a town enacted an ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavation
because it was a proper exercise of police power); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665
(1887) (finding no taking when a state prohibited the manufacturing of liquor because it
was a proper exercise of the police power to prevent the public nuisance of bars and
places where intoxicating liquors are bought and sold); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915) (finding no taking occurred when a city enacted an ordinance preventing the
operation of a brickyard due to noxious odors that constituted a public nuisance);
Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888)
(finding no taking occurred when the government prohibited the manufacture of
oleomargarine to protect “dairymen, and to prevent deception in sales of butter and
cheese,” despite the owner’s allegation that “if prevented from continuing it, the value of
his property employed therein would be entirely lost and he be deprived of the means of
livelihood”); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023–26 (1992)
(describing the Court’s early precedent on “‘[h]armful or noxious use’ analysis”);
Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1879) (finding that it was lawful for the government
to destroy property without compensation to the owner in order to prevent the spreading
of a fire).
202
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, at 496
(1987)(“[P]etitioners have never claimed that their mining operations, or even any
specific mines, have been unprofitable since the Subsidence Act was passed. Nor is there
evidence that mining in any specific location affected by the 50% rule has been
unprofitable.”).
203
The Court also found that the diminution of value of the coal companies’
subterranean mining rights was not substantial enough to outweigh the public interests.
This was another way this case was distinguished from Mahon, which made the mining of
certain coal “commercially impracticable.” Id. at 493.
204
444 U.S. 51 (1979).
205
Id. at 54.
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or restraint upon [eagle products]”206 and it was “not clear that
appellees will be unable to derive economic benefit from the artifacts.”207 The Court seemed to reach this conclusion by relying on
the logic that “where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”208 Thus,
lack of any physical confiscation of the eagle feathers meant that
the artifact dealers maintained their traditional property right to
possess, transport, and gift the property,209 but merely lost a strand
of their property rights by not being able to dispose of their property as they saw fit.210
By contrast, the Court found a taking had occurred in Hodel v.
Irving,211 which considered the Indian Land Consolidation Act.212
This Act sought to remedy a failed policy of the late 19th century to
grant individual Indians ownership of parcels of communal Indian
reservations.213 Over several generations, the ownership of the parcels became so splintered among various heirs that the land could
not be used beneficially.214 Section 207 of the Act prohibited certain types of land with splintered ownership from passing to the
next generation (further splintering ownership), instead passing the
land ownership back to the tribe.215 The Court found that the economic impacts were minimal, but not trivial.216 The Court even
206

Id. at 65.
Id. at 66. It is important to note that this is essentially a manifestation of the two
Agins factors articulated in the Court’s next term.
208
Id. at 66–67.
209
Id. at 65–66 (finding that the deprivation of an important “strand” in the bundle of
property rights of the coal companies did not constitute a taking); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) (finding no taking had occurred, in part, because “the
ordinance did not extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership” (quotation omitted)).
210
Arguably, had the Penn Central test been applied, a different result would have been
likely. The Court may have found a taking when considering that the law greatly impacted
the economic market of selling eagle feathers and impacted the Native American artifact
dealers’ bottom line; additionally, this effected the dealers’ investment-backed interests
because the dealers had already acquired these feathers through likely monetary means
with plans to acquire a return from the sale of such feathers for a profit.
211
481 U.S. 704 (1987).
212
25 U.S.C. § 2201–2221 (2012).
213
Hodel, 481 U.S. at 706–08.
214
Id. at 709.
215
Id.
216
Id.at 714–15.
207
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stated that “[i]f we were to stop our analysis at this point, we might
well find § 207 constitutional.”217 However, the Court ultimately
found a taking occurred because “the character of the Government
regulation here is extraordinary.”218 The government was depriving Native Americans “the right to pass on a certain type of property . . . to one’s heirs. In one form or another, the right to pass on
property—to one’s family in particular—has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times.”219 Such a deprivation of “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights”220
constituted a taking.221 Interestingly, this “bundle of rights” principle as applied in Hodel appears to be related—and perhaps the
underlying justification—for the Penn Central factor of the “character of the government action.”222
Yet, the property bundle undercurrent seems also closely related to the economic Agins and Penn Central factors according to the
Court’s reasoning in Lucas.223 As discussed earlier,224 Lucas involved a law that prevented a property owner from capitalizing on
his investment in undeveloped beachfront property. Based upon
the finding that this law had rendered the property owner’s property valueless,225 the Court found that a taking had occurred because
the owner’s investment-backed expectations to build single-family
homes on his property had been destroyed.226 Thus, the right to
improve one’s property, as was in contention in Lucas, was closely
related to the owner’s investment-backed expectations that he
217

Id. at 716.
Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
219
Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716 (citation omitted).
220
Id. (citing Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 176).
221
Id. at 718; see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (finding
a taking when the government sought to require a permanent easement for the public
across a property owner’s private beach because the Court has “repeatedly held that, as
to property reserved by its owner for private use, ‘the right to exclude [others is] one of
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982))); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994).
222
Penn Cent. Transp. Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
223
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
224
See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text.
225
The Court relied upon the state trial court’s determination that the land was
“valueless.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006, 1009.
226
Id. at 1027, 1031–32.
218
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could derive economic benefits from building homes on his two
lots. The deprivation of this important property right, as well as the
deprivation of all economic use of his land, led the Court to conclude that a taking had occurred. From the Court’s own pen, it appears that assessing the loss of important property rights has guided Takings jurisprudence and should be considered as a guiding
principle in the future.
c) Deference to the Legislature
The last underlying principle that this Article highlights is the
self-imposed check upon the judiciary in giving deference to the
judgment of the legislature in its exercise of police powers. This
principle is rooted in the separation of powers ethic and recognizes
that “the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the
public needs to be served by social legislation . . . . The role of the
judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a
public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”227 Because legislatures are deemed to be a closer representation of the people’s will,
the courts are called upon to exercise minimal scrutiny of the legislature’s designs.228

227

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
In this way, Takings cases are peculiar among other constitutional determinations.
The First Amendment employs complex doctrinal tests to uphold or deny
constitutionality in protecting the freedom of speech and freedom of religion. See, e.g.,
Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Virg. Pharmacy Bd. v. Virg. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970). The
Fourteenth Amendment also has different levels of scrutiny to determine
constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483 (1955) (applying the rational basis test), with United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (applying strict scrutiny). These cases illustrate the judiciary’s check upon the
legislature, and the power of judicial review to protect the people’s rights from a growing
police state. Ironically, the Court does not employ such an important check upon the
legislature in Takings cases, which protect what many founders thought to be the
essential cornerstone of a free society: private ownership of property. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text; see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“When this
seemingly absolute protection [from taking private property without just compensation] is
found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to
extend the qualification more and more, until at last private property disappears.”).
228
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This principle of deference can be traced from Mahon229 all the
way to Kelo v. City of New London.230 While this principle continues
to govern in determining the Public Use Inquiry,231 its influence in
the Takings Inquiry has been slowly diminishing. For example, in
Dolan v. City of Tigard,232 Florence Dolan sought a permit from the
city of Tigard to expand her plumbing, expand her electrical supply
store, and pave her parking lot.233 The City Planning Commission
granted Dolan’s permit, but only on the condition that Dolan dedicate a portion of her property to a city greenway system to assist
with occasional flooding of a nearby creek; additionally, the Commission required Dolan to dedicate a portion of her land for use as a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway.234 The Court applied Agins to determine if the “land use regulation . . . ‘substantially advance[d] legitimate state interests.’”235 The Court found that the city had legitimate reasons for requiring the storm drainage system based on the
concern for preventing flooding along a nearby creek. Also, the
pathway for non-vehicular traffic was legitimate in an effort to cut
down on vehicular traffic and make alternative transportation less
burdensome.236 However, the governmental action must bear a
“rough proportionality” with accomplishing these legitimate state
interests.237 Thus, the city’s regulation for apportioning part of Do-

229

“The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is open
to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional
power.” Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
230
545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (recognizing a “longstanding policy of deference to
legislative judgments” in the field of “public use”).
231
Id.
232
512 U.S. 374 (1992).
233
Id. at 379.
234
Id. at 379–80.
235
Id. at 385 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
236
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387–88.
237
Cases like Nollan and Dolan started to give teeth to takings inquiries. The Dolan
Court specifically recognized the similarities between the “rough proportionality” test
and the “rational basis” test “which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Court detracted from any
theory that these were the same tests by specifically choosing different terms in order to
dispel confusion. See id. at 391; see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834
n.3 (1987) (discrediting the idea that takings analysis is the same as that of equal
protection and due process. “[T]here is no reason to believe (and the language of our
cases gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as the regulation of property is at issue
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lan’s property for a greenway was not roughly proportional because
its interest of preventing flooding with a public greenway could be
as easily accomplished with a private greenway owned by Dolan.238
Further, the city’s finding that building a pedestrian/bicycle path
“could offset some of the traffic demand is a far cry from a finding
that the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to, offset some of
the traffic demand.”239 Thus, in this unique case where the burden
was put on the government to justify its action,240 the city did not
meet its burden of showing how its conditions for granting Dolan
an expansion permit substantially advanced state interests.
Dolan relied heavily on another similar case that found a government taking: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.241 In
Nollan, the California Coastal Commission agreed to grant the
Nollans’ building permit for their beachfront property on the condition that they allow a public easement across their private
beach.242 The Court acknowledged the deference paid to the legislature by stating that even though its cases had not “elaborated on
the standards for determining what constitutes a ‘legitimate state
interest’ . . . . They have made clear, however, that a broad range of
governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements.”243 The Commission asserted its legitimate state interests
as “protecting the public’s ability to see the beach, assisting the
public in overcoming the ‘psychological barrier’ to using the beach
created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on
the public beaches.”244 Yet, even when assuming these state interests were in fact legitimate, the Court found no logical connection,
or “essential nexus,” between conditioning the building permit
upon these reasons. After all, if the Nollans built a house on the
beachfront property, this would block the public’s view of the
the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal protection
challenges are identical.”).
238
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 392–93.
239
Id. at 395 (citation omitted).
240
See id. at 391 n.8 (finding that in the rare cases where “the city made an adjudicative
decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual parcel.
In this situation, the burden properly rests on the city” (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836)).
241
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
242
Id. at 828.
243
Id. at 834–35.
244
Id. at 835.
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beach from the street regardless of whether there was an easement
on the beachside of the property.245 For the same reason, an easement on the beachside of the property would not help congestion at
beaches or the so-called “psychological barrier” that existed.246
Both Nollan and Dolan finally began to establish teeth to the Takings Inquiry after giving the legislature247 a pass for so long as to its
occasional suspect reasoning for imposing regulations that affected
property owners’ use of their property.248 In this way, the principle
of paying deference to the legislature was closely tied to the judicial
check provided by scrutinizing whether the challenged government
action substantially advanced a legitimate state interest under the
Agins factors.
This check on the legislature came to an end when the Court
abrogated the “substantially advances a legitimate state interest”
test in Lingle.249 Lingle involved a limit in Hawaii on the rent oil
companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service
stations as a response to the effects of market concentration on
gasoline prices.250 Chevron, one of the largest oil companies doing
business in Hawaii, argued that the rent cap was a taking that required just compensation.251 In an effort to “correct course,” the
Court revoked the “substantially advances” Agins factor because
245

Id. at 836–39.
Id.
247
Interestingly, however, both Nollan and Dolan factually involved scrutinizing
adjudicative, not legislative, decisions. See Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750
F.3d 1128, 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015). In fact, many of the
Court’s most important Takings Clause cases involve administrative agencies or actors of
the executive implementing the laws that the legislature has enacted. This fact does
nothing to unwind the underlying principle above, since the Court often looks past the
action of the executive actor to the purpose of the legislative enactment. See, e.g., Pa. Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412–13 (1922); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28–33 (1954);
Horne, 750 F.3d at 1133–34, 1144.
248
See Wilcox, supra note 114, at 484 (arguing that Nollan was a turning point for the
Court, establishing “that land use regulations and the judgment of . . . regulators would be
given much less judicial deference”); see also James H. Freis, Jr. & Stefan V. Reyniak,
Putting Takings Back Into the Fifth Amendment: Land Use Planning After Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 103, 105 (1996); Danaya C. Wright, Eminent Domain,
Exactions, and Railbanking: Can Recreational Trails Survive the Court’s Fifth Amendment
Takings Jurisprudence, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 399, 406 (2001).
249
544 U.S. 528 (2004).
250
Id. at 533.
251
Id.
246
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the “inquiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of
the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private property
rights. Nor does it provide any information about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property owners.”252
The Court also notably claimed that the abolition of the “substantially advances” test did not “disturb any of [its] prior holdings.”253 Given the numerous applications of the Agins factors, this
statement seems dubious; however uncertain this statement’s truth
is, it is nonetheless outside the scope of this Article. Noteworthy is
the Court’s claim that the “substantially advances” test was never
really a part of the undercurrent of its cases. By abolishing this test,
the Court essentially plucked out the teeth of the Takings Inquiry
by eliminating a court’s ability to scrutinize the motives of legislatures when enacting regulations or imposing takings. Thus, the
Court’s acknowledgment that the “substantially advances” test
has never dispositively decided any of its cases means that the opposite principle—the deference paid to legislatures—has been such
an undercurrent to Takings Clause doctrine.
Thus, the three underlying principles laid out in this Article not
only connect with several of the Court’s determinations of takings
over the years, but they also connect with each other. As stated in
Lingle, the Penn Central factors are really based on a regulation’s
effect on property rights (“property bundle”) and its effects on the
burden distributed to property owners. Lastly, Lingle’s abandonment of the “substantially advances” test practically gives more
deference to legislative actions.
B. Public Use Inquiry
The deference paid to legislatures is most powerfully felt in the
Court’s determination of whether a taking is for “public use.” In
fact, the Public Use Inquiry is almost inseparable from the Court’s
deference to the legislature.
The Court’s most controversial Takings Clause cases have
contested the interpretation of the term “public use.” The way the
Takings Clause is framed, the drafters assumed that the govern252
253

Id. at 542.
Id. at 545.
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ment taking was being made for a public use254 and that such a taking must be accompanied by just compensation. Thus, a constitutional taking must pass the bar of being for public use. This bar,
however, is inordinately low. Public Use doctrine has become so
broad in the past century, trusting legislatures with almost a blind
faith, that it is hard to imagine a taking that could not fit this low
standard.255
The Court started down this path as far back as Mahon,256 and
further matured the doctrine in Berman v. Parker257 and Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff.258 In Berman, Congress’s recently enacted District of Columbia Redevelopment Act was in question;259
the Act permitted a public redevelopment agency to identify and
254

An odd interpretation would be one that suggested that takings for nonpublic uses
would not be subject to just compensation. Since the type of taking is specifically qualified
as one for public use, nonpublic use takings are not considered; thus, just compensation
would not be a constitutional requirement. I have not seen such an interpretation
forwarded in good conscious, wholly because such an interpretation is not intellectually or
practically sustainable.
255
See Madigan, supra note 5, at 181 (“In practice . . . judicial review has been so
deferential that a finding of public use seems inevitable.” (citing Peter J. Kulick,
Comment, Rolling the Dice: Determining Public Use in Order to Effectuate a “Public-Private
Taking”—A Proposal to Redefine “Public Use”, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 639, 655
(2000))).
256
See supra note 93.
257
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
258
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
259
It is ironic that Berman—an opinion that showed great trust in the government’s
motives regarding takings—was decided during a time period that the Warren Court
handed down some of its most iconic anti-government decisions that illustrated a great
distrust of government actors in civil rights and criminal law. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s
Democratic Pragmatism 3–4 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper
No. 267, 2005) (“To many people, the idea of judicial deference to the elected branches
lost much of its theoretical appeal in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Supreme Court,
under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, was invalidating school segregation
[Brown v. Bd. of Educ.], protecting freedom of speech [Brandenburg v. Ohio], striking down
poll taxes [Harper v. Bd. of Elections], requiring a rule of one person, one vote [Reynolds v.
Sims], and protecting accused criminals against police abuse [Miranda v. Arizona].”).
Perhaps the Warren Court was more distrusting of the executive and its actors, but put
more trust in legislatures that were seen as more representative of the people and more
readily served their needs.
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condemn blighted areas of Washington, D.C. and transfer the
property to public agencies, redevelopment companies, individuals,
or partnerships for redevelopment.260 This Act was passed due to
Congress’s finding that blight was “injurious to the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare.”261 The constitutionality of this plan
was challenged on the basis that seizing land for the purposes of
aesthetic beautification262 did not meet the standard of public use.
As the petitioners argued, condemning the land and giving it to
private organizations would not subject the land to public use, but
rather to private ownership.263 The Court found that seizing property to combat blight was a public use because, as Congress had
determined, it served to remedy injurious conditions to public
health. Thus, the Court began its semantic campaign to redefine
the term “public use” to instead mean “public purpose”264 or
“public benefit.”265 The Court expressed its great faith in the sanctity of legislatures to exercise the state’s police power266 as “the
main guardian of the public needs,” and that it was within the legislature’s prerogative “to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well balanced

260

See Berman, 348 U.S. at 28, 30.
Id. at 28.
262
Berman is an important case in clearly defining the power of “States and cities [to]
enact land use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the
character and desirable aesthetic features of a city.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978) (citing N. Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976);
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U. S. 1, 9–10 (1974); Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (1954); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. at 214
(1909)).
263
Berman, 348 U.S. at 31.
264
“The role of the judiciary in determining whether [the eminent domain] power is
being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.” Id. at 32 (emphasis
added) (citing Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925); United States
ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946)).
265
Kelo v. City of New London, 544 U.S. 469, 490–91 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(using the term “public benefits” when commenting on the Court’s application of a type
of rational-basis review to ensure that public benefits are not merely pretextual means to
satisfy the “Public Use Clause”).
266
“Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order—these are
some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power
to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power, and do not delimit
it.” Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
261
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as well as carefully patrolled.”267 After all, “[t]he values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.”268
The Court affirmed this “public benefit” interpretation of the
Takings Clause in Midkiff, in which the Hawaii legislature sought
to divide lands which were held by a few dozen private landowners.269 As a result of the highly concentrated land holdings, the legislature found that the state’s fee simple real estate market was inflated, and the public welfare was being injured.270 To remedy the
issue, the legislature encouraged those renting land to petition the
legislature; upon such petition, the legislature would condemn the
land from the owner, and sell it to the lessee at a fair market
price.271 Relying greatly on Berman, the Court found that the legislature’s condemnation scheme was constitutional because it was
being used for a public use. The Court found that the “‘public use’
requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”272 Thus, public use is as broad as the state’s police
powers, which can be used to regulate nearly everything. While the
Court noted that the public use requirement is a standard that governments must satisfy, it made clear that this standard only requires a legitimate rationale that will not be overturned “unless the
use be palpably without reasonable foundation.”273
Things came to a boiling point when the Court found that condemning private property and selling it to a private corporation
promising to redevelop the area, provide jobs, and improve the tax
base was within the broad understanding of “public use.”274 This
was exactly the case in Kelo, in which the city of New London con267

Id. at 33.
Id.
269
Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984). The Hawaii
legislature’s actions were based on their finding that 47% of privately owned land was held
by 72 landowners. Further, 40% of that land was owned by only 18 landowners. Id.
270
Id.
271
Id. at 233–34.
272
Id. at 240.
273
Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Electric R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680
(1896)); see also id. at 240 (“deference to the legislature’s ‘public use’ determination is
required ‘until it is shown to involve an impossibility.’” (citing Old Dominion Co. v.
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925))).
274
See Kelo v. City of New London, 544 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
268
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demned the home of Susette Kelo, one of a few holdout property
owners, in order to turn it over to Pfizer Corporation to build a new
facility, among other things.275 After exploring Berman and
Midkiff,276 the Court realized the following:
Our earliest cases in particular embodied a strong
theme of federalism, emphasizing the “great respect” that we owe to state legislatures and state
courts in discerning local public needs. For more
than a century, our public use jurisprudence has
wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in
determining what public needs justify the use of the
takings power.277
Thus, the legislature’s plan of condemning private property for
the purpose of “economic rejuvenation is entitled to . . . deference.”278 Of note, the dissenting Justices aptly warned that “all
private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to
another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e., given
to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more
beneficial to the public—in the process.”279 Further, the dissenters
argued that there was no longer any distinction between “private
and public use of property” and that the words “for public use”
had been practically deleted from the Takings Clause.280
C. Just Compensation Inquiry
In contrast to the Public Use Inquiry, the Just Compensation
Inquiry is the least controversial and consequently the least explored part of the Takings Clause. Generally, just compensation
means “the fair market value of the property on the date it is appropriated. Under this standard, the owner is entitled to receive
what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller at the time

275
276
277
278
279
280

Id. at 474–75.
Id. at 480–82.
Id. at 482–83.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
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of the taking.”281 In the case of regulatory takings, the diminution
of the fair market value is the correct standard to apply.282 Such a
determination can be established by expert testimony from real estate appraisers at the condemnation hearing. Further, even though
many property owners may attach a higher value to their property
due to “relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special
suitability of the property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs,” they are nonetheless not hurt on any constitutional basis when the government only pays the fair market value for a taking.283
However, even this seemingly straightforward valuation process can be complicated when considering temporary takings. As
cited above,284 First English was the Court’s first foray into this
field.285 Assuming that a taking had occurred, the Court found that
just compensation was due even for a temporary regulatory taking.286 This logic was based on the government being “required to
pay compensation for leasehold interests of shorter duration than
this. The value of a leasehold interest in property for a period of
years may be substantial, and the burden on the property owner in
extinguishing such an interest for a period of years may be great
indeed.”287 Later, Tahoe clarified the timing for such a leasehold
interest, which would begin and end on the first and last day, respectively, that the restrictive regulatory scheme was effective over
the petitioning owner.288
281

Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511–13
(1979)).
282
Furey v. City of Sacramento, 592 F. Supp. 463, 469 (E.D. Cal. 1984) (calculating the
diminution in value by “compar[ing] the fair market value of the property immediately
before the enactment of the challenged regulation with the fair market value of the
property immediately thereafter”), aff’d, 780 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Deltona
Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (comparing the fair market
value of the property after the regulation was enacted with the owner’s cost basis).
283
Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).
284
See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text.
285
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
286
Id. at 313 (footnote omitted).
287
Id. at 319 (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379–84 (1945)).
288
Id. at 328 (“[T]he government entity must pay just compensation for the period
commencing on the date the regulation first effected the ‘taking,’ and ending on the date
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IV.

WHERE THE PAINT HITS THE CANVAS: ARE STREET
ART ORDINANCES TAKINGS THAT REQUIRE JUST
COMPENSATION?
While the Supreme Court has not exactly established a pristine
model of predictability in Takings Clause analysis, it is unlikely that
a Fifth Amendment challenge to any of the street art ordinances
around the country could withstand doctrinal scrutiny. The Takings Inquiry, as determined by where the Court currently stands,
would almost certainly be decided in the negative because the
street art ordinances do not squarely fit within the necessary
bounds of either a physical taking or regulatory taking. However, a
better case may be made when applying the underlying principles
of such doctrines.
As a preliminary matter, this Article assumes that property
owners will only challenge street art ordinances with respect to
valuable or expressive street art.289 A city’s efforts to remove gang
graffiti, offensive tagging, or other valueless street art would not
likely be contested by property owners who would rationally be
concerned only with property values. Thus, in the smaller number
of cases where street art is thought to have added value to a property, and a city attempts to impose compliance with street art ordinances, a property owner would be most likely to challenge said
ordinances.
A. Street Art Takings Under the Doctrinal Approach
Courts would be hard-pressed to find that the street art ordinances constituted a physical taking under current doctrine. First,
the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation.”) (citing
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658 (1981)); see also
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 362–63 (1986).
289
Street artists themselves would not have standing to challenge the ordinances as a
taking because their property has not been affected. They effectively waive their rights to
their work when they use a canvas that belongs to a property owner in which that property
owner did not commission. Even in cases of commissioned street art, artists have very
limited rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
See generally Amin, supra note 86, at 319–20 (even under the rights provided by VARA, in
many instances commissioned street artists do not retain standing to challenge their art’s
removal (discussing Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct.
1949))).
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the government is not physically taking any part of an owner’s
property by asserting ownership of it themselves. Instead, it is asserting its regulatory police power to abate what it considers a public nuisance.290 Thus, both before and after removal of the street
art, the property owner retains title to the property. A novel argument could be made that the city’s paint itself constitutes a permanent physical invasion of a portion of the property owners’ property, evoking the per se rule of Loretto.291 This seems unlikely. Paint
used to cover street art is perceived as one-dimensional; it does not
take up space, add volume, or add weight. While it has never been
tested, Loretto reads as finding takings where there is some measurable change, however small, in the three-dimensional realm. Paint,
while affecting color and the way a physical wall is perceived, does
not impose any three-dimensional burden or occupation upon the
property owner.292 On the other hand, Causby stands for the proposition that government invasions need not even be physical to
constitute a taking.293 Mere light and sound invasions—while scientifically measurable—are not three-dimensional burdens physically occupying the property owner’s land; yet, these light and
sound invasions were still found to be a government taking worthy
of just compensation.294 However, the Court in Causby also relied
upon the economic effects of the invasion to reach its decision;
thus, the closing of the owner’s chicken farm business—as well as
the effect on the enjoyment of the property—were integral in the
290

L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.6 (2014); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915).
291
Such an argument could only be made when the government uses its own resources
to remove the street art, such as it does in Los Angeles. See L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch.
IV, art. 14, § 49.84.7(A) (2014). In contrast, the New York law requires property owners
themselves to remove street art using their own resources; as a result, the property owner
in New York, using his own paint to cover street art, could not assert such a Loretto per se
argument because it is his own paint that occupies that portion of his property, not the
government’s paint. See also Amin, supra note 86 (arguing that forcing a property owner
to live with a mural that he no longer wants on his property could be tantamount to a
physical invasion because it robs him of an important property right).
292
If street art ordinances, for example, allowed city workers to physically remove the
portion of the wall containing the street art, in a similar way that Banksy beneficiaries do,
such physical appropriation of that wall would constitute a taking in a way that mere paint
never could. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
293
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266–67 (1946).
294
Id.
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Court’s decision.295 The street art ordinances, on the other hand,
may in fact impose a government invasion, but its economic effect
on the property owner’s ability to do business is hardly affected at
all; such a set of facts would not likely be enough to constitute a
taking under the Court’s current physical occupation or invasion
jurisprudence. However, such a challenge to a court would be an
interesting development in Takings Clause law and would have the
potential of changing the landscape of street art ordinances around
the country.
If a finding of a permanent physical taking is unlikely, a finding
of a temporary physical taking would be even more improbable.
Such a theory would posit that the temporary easement allowing
city workers onto the property to remove the street art was tantamount to a taking. While the city of Los Angeles reserves the right
to enter onto a property owner’s property without prior consent,296
such a temporary trespass297 cannot be considered a physical taking
under Arkansas Game & Fish Commission.298 First, the extremely
short timeframe of the suspension of the right to exclude cuts
against finding a taking. The few hours it would take to remove the
street art is almost inconsequential when compared to the several
years found in most temporary takings cases.299 Second, the invasion is likely foreseeable due to the existence of the ordinances
themselves; thus, if a property owner finds himself the beneficiary
of a work of street art, he could likely expect to be contacted by the
proper authorities regarding its removal. Further, if he refused to
give consent for the proper authorities to come onto the property
to remove the street art, the temporary suspension of his right to
exclude them would be predictable. Lastly, the severity of the invasion is relatively minor. Having one or a few city workers come on

295

Id. at 259.
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.8(A), (B) (2014).
297
At best, property owners could construe a city’s action as a physical trespass on their
property in order to gain access to the street art for removal. In many cases, this theory
would be inapplicable because most street art is placed on outside walls accessible by
public sidewalks. Thus, city workers could access the street art by the public sidewalk
without ever trespassing on private property.
298
133 S. Ct. 511, 522–23 (2012).
299
See, e.g., supra notes 174–79 and accompanying text.
296
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to his property once300 to remove street art is not deleterious to the
property owner’s ability to use or enjoy the property for any period
of time.
Since the street art ordinances address a property owner’s
rights to how he uses and enjoys his property, the path of lesser resistance would be to show that the enforcement of the ordinances
constituted a regulatory taking. Asserting Lucas’s per se rule of regulatory takings would be inappropriate because the street art ordinances do not deprive the property owner of all the economically
beneficial uses of his land.301 The ordinances only target specific
portions of the property that are not in compliance and do not prevent business owners from conducting their business; neither
would they interfere with lessor-lessee relationships while the ordinances are being enforced. Thus, even while either the property
owner or city workers are removing street art on the property,
business can go on as usual because of the noninvasive nature of
the street art removal.
Getting no help from the Lucas per se rule, a regulatory taking
challenge would have to rely on the Penn Central factors.302 First,
the nature of the government action is noninvasive and rather minimal, especially when comparing it to other regulatory schemes that
have come before the Court.303 However, while previous zoning
laws and preservation efforts have prevented development of land,
the street art ordinances go one step further by imposing harsh civil304 and criminal penalties.305 Second, the street art ordinances do
not affect investment-backed expectations that the property owner
300

See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 522–23 (“[W]hile a single act may not
be enough, a continuance of them in sufficient number and for a sufficient time may prove
[a taking].” (alterations in original) (quoting Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1922))).
301
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1103, 1019 (1992); Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39 (2004).
302
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
303
See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 18–13 (1978)
(requiring approval from the Landmarks Preservation Commission before altering any
building deemed to be a landmark); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 52–56 (1979)
(prohibiting the sale of eagle feathers).
304
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.12 (2014).
305
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00, 145.05, 145.10, and 145.60 (McKinney 2014)
(imposing misdemeanor and felony criminal charges).
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had when attaining title for the property. No property owner buys a
piece of property with reasonable hopes of winning the real estate
lottery by being gifted with a Banksy work or other valuable piece
of art on the side of their building. Rather, the occurrences of valuable street art are quite random and are pleasant surprises to beneficiaries.306 Third, and probably the most helpful, is the economic
impact of the street art ordinances. As has been established, street
art can substantially raise property values and gentrify communities.307 Nevertheless, in both Penn Central and Agins, the Court did
not find that laws restricting certain real estate development constituted regulatory takings, even though such restrictions on development cost the respective property owners potentially millions of
dollars in expected revenue.308 Thus, the portion of the street art
ordinances that gives the government the affirmative right to remove street art seems less injurious economically to property owners than other laws that the Court rejected based on a regulatory
takings argument.
Neither could petitioners of the ordinances rely on Nollan or
Dolan, two cases that gave teeth in finding regulatory takings.309
These cases dealt with the government’s imposed requirement on
a landowner to get building permits and the extent these requirements would advance a legitimate state interest. The ordinances, to
an extent, do impose a similar type of regulatory extortion310 by re306

See, e.g., Banksy Artwork Saves Youth Club as it Sells for £400k, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 27,
2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/11059481/Banksy-artworksaves-youth-club-as-it-sells-for-400k.html (describing a youth club thanking Banksy for
leaving his piece “Mobile Lovers” on their property, which allowed them to sell the piece
to get out of debt and continue operating). The occurrences of gang graffiti, on the other
hand, are more predictable based on the neighborhood and corresponding gang territory;
however, property owners would not likely challenge street art ordinances in efforts to
remove gang graffiti, but only street art they found economically beneficial.
307
See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
308
See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 117; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 (1980).
309
See supra notes 232–48 and accompanying text.
310
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (describing land use
restriction as “an out-and-out plan of extortion” (citing J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson,
432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (N.H. 1981)); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as
a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 942 n.51 (“The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine prohibits the government from conditioning the receipt of a public
benefit, even a benefit to which the recipient is not entitled, upon the surrender of a
constitutional right.” (citations omitted)).
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quiring property owners to allow government access to property to
remove street art; in return, the property owners avoid penalties.
However, unlike in Nollan and Dolan, Los Angeles and other cities311 have relied on the widely asserted “Broken Windows Theory”312 to serve as their legitimate state interest of which removal of
street art is intimately related. Thus, when painting street art with
such a broad brush, such a regulation would not be seen as arbitrary,313 but would in most cases be considered as a reasonable way
of reducing crime and gang activity.
Another aspect of the street art ordinances are the portions that
restrict a property owner from developing his property by commissioning street art himself,314 or from displaying aerosols or markers
in their stores in a less restrictive way.315 This is more akin to the
traditional regulatory taking case because it would challenge a law
that prevents property owners from affirmatively doing something
with their property, such as selling chattels316 or expanding their
property.317 At least one court has already contemplated and rejected these types of challenges, finding that the ordinance under attack was an appropriate exercise of the state’s police power and did
not constitute a regulatory taking.318
311

See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, §§ 49.84.1(B)–(C) (2014); S.F.,
CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE art. 23, §§ 1301(a), (c) (2014).
312
See Mettler, supra note 12, at 254 n.36 (describing the Broken Windows Theory as a
“hypothesis [that] assumes that areas rife with indicia of urban disorder—shattered
windows or prolific graffiti, for instance—invite crime by suggesting that no one cares to
maintain order in those areas” (citing GREGORY J. SNYDER, GRAFFITI LIVES: BEYOND THE
TAG IN NEW YORK’S URBAN UNDERGROUND 48 (2009))).
313
See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1974) (holding that economic
and social legislation enacted by the legislature will be upheld if it is reasonable, not
arbitrary, and bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective); see also Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (deferring to the legislature’s
“public use” purpose “until it is shown to involve an impossibility” (citing Old
Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925))).
314
L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 14, § 49.84.3(B) (2014).
315
Id. § 49.84.4(A).
316
See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 54 (1979).
317
See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 117 (1978);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 (1980); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
379 (1994); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614–15 (2001).
318
See, e.g., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 857 F. Supp. 1355, 1372
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (upholding a San Francisco ordinance requiring store owners to display
spray paint and markers used in street art in a way that employee assistance is required to
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B. Street Art Takings Applying Underlying Principles
A challenge to the street art ordinances does not seem to pass
doctrinal muster in the Takings Inquiry, but the underlying principles of such doctrines seem to be more forgiving. Thus, if street art
ordinances are not takings under current doctrine, should they be
due to the application of underlying principles?
First, the application of the street art ordinances upon certain
landowners who enjoy valuable pieces of street art on their property does seem to be singling out certain landowners to bear costs on
behalf of the entire community. While these ordinances potentially
apply to everyone, they are selectively applied to property owners
who have street art on their property. In theory, the entire community is subject to the street art ordinances, similar to zoning ordinances in Agins319 or city planning redevelopment projects in Berman.320 However, unlike in those cases, not everyone in the community is practically subject to application of the street art ordinances on their property. This would be similar to an ordinance
where cities reserved the right to plug up oil wells in the rare instance when a property owner found oil reserves underneath his
property. Because of the rarity of this occurrence, most of the
community would not realistically ever be subject to this ordinance; however, the few times that a property owner struck oil, the
ordinance would be put into effect. This is tantamount to finding a
valuable asset on your property that was not there before, such as a
street artist potentially raising property value with a piece of street
art. To impose the ordinance on a few property owners who now
enjoy higher property values in order to combat valueless street art
would be asking that property owner to suffer a diminution of value
to his property in order to comply with the overall public benefit of
a uniform city plan.321
gain access to these products as a legitimate use of police power); see also Nat’l Paint &
Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1130 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding Chicago
ordinance prohibiting sale of “spray paint and jumbo indelible markers,” but noting that
the plaintiffs—store owners that sold these items—did not pursue a claim under the
Takings Clause, which would be a business’s remedy for “substantive protections”).
319
Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
320
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28–30 (1954).
321
This is not to say that all ordinances that seek to remedy nuisances when they arise
constitute takings. Rather, this underlying principle points towards the type of
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Second, several sticks of an owner’s property rights bundle are
disturbed by the street art ordinances. The ordinances strip the
property owner’s right to exclude, which is the most important
property right of all.322 The ordinances render a property owner
powerless to exclude the government from trespassing on his property when they have deemed it necessary to abate a public nuisance, which ironically, may actually raise his property value and
that of nearby neighbors.323 Further, the property owner loses his
right to dispose of his property, such as sell the property, as he sees
fit.324 By removing the street art, the city denies the property owner
the chance to remove the piece from his wall physically and sell it
for profit on the open market.325 The loss of these sticks in the
bundle of property rights is significant,326 and further support finding a taking.
The third underlying principle, courts’ deference to the legislature, is the only principle that appears to cut against finding a taking. As a common theme in Takings Clause law, courts have always
afforded great deference to the legislature’s prerogative in exercising eminent domain or adopting regulations that affect property
rights.327 Regarding street art ordinances, legislatures have declared
street art to be a public nuisance primarily because it lowers property values, incites crime, and contributes to the insecurity of the

government action that may constitute a taking, especially when considering the potential
diminution of property value that would be suffered in the covering up of valuable street
art.
322
See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 n.11 (1979).
323
This does not ignore that in certain emergencies, government actors are allowed to
trespass on and even damage private property without consent and without paying just
compensation. See generally C. Wayne Owen Jr., Everyone Benefits, Everyone Pays: Does the
Fifth Amendment Mandate Compensation When Property is Damaged During the Course of
Police Activities?, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 277 (2000) (finding that current doctrine
does not find a taking when law enforcement officers damage private property in the
performance of their duties). However, abating nuisance is not such an emergency, and
without an easement, consent is required to enter private property.
324
See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
325
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
326
While “the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a
taking,” Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65, the loss of multiple sticks in the bundle, including the
right to exclude, weighs in favor of finding a taking. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179–80.
327
See supra Part II.A.3.c.

740

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:685

community.328 As has been examined in Part II of this Article, these
findings by the legislatures are questionable.329 As noted above in
Part IV, however, they are not arbitrary or impossible.330 As such,
courts will not approach the findings of the legislatures in imposing
such laws.331 Instead, courts are content with assuming the legislature’s findings are correct.
C. Proposed Solutions to Street Art Takings
The above analysis creates a conflict: while street art ordinances would not likely be deemed as a taking by courts applying modern Takings Clause doctrine, the underlying principles that gird
those doctrines suggest that there is enough of a societal imbalance
of harms and potential loss of property rights to justify a taking
when valuable pieces of street art are removed. Even if the strength
of such conflict is questioned, it seems an unjust outcome that
property owners would be subject to a regulatory scheme that economically lowers the value of their property, even if it may be economically beneficial in other applications. It is true that many
times, property owners are asked to sacrifice economic value and
property rights for the good of the community,332 but a regulation
that attempts coercion that can potentially result in hundred thousand dollar losses seems like it should have some viable safeguards
to protect against the occasional economic injustice and loss of important property rights.
This naturally leads into this Article’s brief attempt to find solutions that can both protect the interests of legislatures seeking to
exercise police powers to protect public health and welfare, and the
interests of property owners who seek to maximize their property
values and that of the community.

328

See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74, 76 and accompanying text.
330
See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
331
See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
332
See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 (“Government could hardly go on if, to some extent,
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied
limitation, and must yield to the police power.”).
329
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1. Higher Judicial Scrutiny
First, a judiciary that applied a lower standard of deference and
a higher level of scrutiny to legislative action would raise legitimate
questions about street art ordinances. The existing state of deference in Takings Clause law carries the risk that the taking itself, as
well as the public benefit meant to accrue from the taking, are
merely incidental benefits to a legislative body seeking to benefit
itself or other private interests.333 Thus, the lack of judicial oversight carries the danger of approving exercises of eminent domain
and other takings that are a mere “ruse” of the legally sufficient
reasons given by the legislature.334 Given the heightening levels of
corruption,335 this raises serious concerns of private interests capturing the eminent domain power.336 As new research arises that
suggests certain types of street art can have positive effects on
communities337 and have a small impact on increasing crime,338
perhaps such scrutiny would invalidate legislative prerogatives
based on questionable data.
In an era when public approval ratings of legislatures are consistently at all-time lows339 and when public officials are increasingly corrupt,340 are the courts not justified in applying more scrutiny
333
See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An
Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491,
544–45 (2006) (discussing the danger of the high level of deference afforded to
legislatures when courts take on the Public Use Inquiry).
334
See id. at 545 (citing James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 859, 863).
335
See infra note 340.
336
See Cohen, supra note 333, at 547.
337
See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. See also Madigan, supra note 5, at 192
(arguing that private capture of the eminent domain power meddles with the free market
and diminishes economic efficiency (citing EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS:
THEORY/APPLICATION 277 (1997))).
338
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
339
See David M. Konisky et al., Public Approval of U.S. State Legislatures, 37 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 99, 100 (2012) (finding that across all 50 states, the average approval rating of
citizens’ respective state legislatures was 35%). As of December 2014 and January 2015,
Congress has an approval rating of 16%. David Sherfinski, New Congress Has Approval
Rating of 16 Percent: Poll, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2015), available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/14/new-congress-has-approvalrating-16-percent-poll/.
340
60% of people in the United States believe that political corruption has increased in
the two years prior to the study’s release, with the legislature coming in as the second
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to legislative decisions, especially decisions that may threaten one
of the foundations of a free and democratic society?341 While the
Court is correct that it is ill suited as an institution to take on the
role of legislatures in the takings context,342 the judiciary has recognized the need to check the legislative branch in order to uphold
the Constitution and repudiate injustice.343 Thus, this is not an argument for the courts to distrust legislatures by default, but rather
to couple a lower amount of deference with a higher level of scrutiny in Takings Clause jurisprudence.
Other scholars have advocated for different forms of heightened judicial scrutiny or otherwise higher burdens on the government in their effort to assert eminent domain actions. Cost-benefit
analyses,344 showings of maximization of benefit,345 showings of
necessity,346 showings of future full public use of the condemned
property,347 strict scrutiny analysis,348 and constitutional amendments349 have all been previously suggested to add efficiency and
fairness into Takings Clause jurisprudence. While these proposals
all have shortcomings,350 more judicial oversight of takings is generally welcome.
most corrupt institution according to the poll. The study also points out that 5–10% of
Americans admit to paying a bribe to a public official. See generally Global Corruption
Barometer
2013:
Report,
TRANSPARENCY
INT’L
(2013),
available
at
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2013_globalcorruptionbarometer_en/
1?e=2496456/3903358.
341
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
342
See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text.
343
See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
344
See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
345
See Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11
EVNTL. L. 1, 45–47 (1980).
346
See Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV.
203, 240 (1978).
347
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 166–69 (1985) (proposing that eminent domain only be used when the
benefits would accrue as “public goods” in which no one could be excluded from the
benefit).
348
See Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict
Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 285 (2000).
349
See Cohen, supra note 333, at 568.
350
See id. at 555–58, 567–68.
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Reinventing the wheel is outside the scope of this Article; instead, this Article only seeks to recognize the potential beneficial
application of higher judicial scrutiny when applied to street art
ordinances. This approach of applying some level of scrutiny has
already been applied by Justice Kennedy, making the Public Use
Inquiry tantamount to the Rational Basis Test used in 14th
Amendment Equal Protection analysis.351 While this is certainly a
start, only stricter scrutiny would ensure the courts do not make
the same mistakes of the past.
2. Expansion of Existing Administrative Challenges
Second, cities should expand already existing administrative
challenges to violations of street art ordinances to accommodate
inverse takings proceedings. This way, a property owner, at his
own cost, could put on testimony from the community and from
expert real estate appraisers on the increased value that certain
pieces of street art have on his property. Such an increase in value
should necessitate just compensation to the property owner, since
the enforcement of street art ordinances would actually be diminishing the value of his property and the surrounding community by
removing the valuable street art. While a challenger would be within his legal rights to seek an injunction to stop government actors
from removing the street art, and could subsequently proceed with
an inverse condemnation action in state or federal court, streamlining this process through already existing administrative hearings
would likely be the most efficient use of judicial resources.
Allowing administrative challenges to city-wide regulatory aesthetic schemes, however, carries its own burden on the government; it prevents the very uniformity and city planning that the leg351

See Kelo v. City of New London, 544 U.S. 469, 490–91 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“This Court has declared that a taking should be upheld as consistent with
the Public Use Clause, as long as it is ‘rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.
This deferential standard of review echoes the rational-basis test used to review economic
regulation under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.” (quotation and
citations omitted)); see also Alan T. Ackerman, The Interplay Between the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause: Is the Supreme
Court’s Test for “Public Use” Merely Rational Basis?, http://www.ackermanackerman.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/302/2014/02/Is-the-Supreme-Court%E2%80%
99s-Test-for-%E2%80%9CPublic-Use%E2%80%9D-Merely-Rational-Basis.pdf.
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islature intended to create. If one or two property owners are allowed to hold-out, the entire scheme is put in jeopardy.352 Nevertheless, such administrative costs are worth expending to protect
private property values. In most cases, street art will not add value
to property, and thus property owners will be hesitant to bear the
costs of bringing an inverse condemnation claim. Thus, frivolous
claims will be weeded out by the costs of litigation,353 especially
when considering the expense of hiring independent appraisers.
These costs will increase the likelihood that only meritorious
claims are filed and appropriately litigated with proper expert testimony to establish the effects that a piece of street art has on property values.354
Under such an administrative system, if factual findings are
made that the street art indeed positively affects property values,
the government would be required to commence a formal eminent
domain action to assert the control necessary to remove the street
art. Thus, the government’s ability to take would not be restricted,
but the government would be required to justly compensate the
property owner for the tremendous diminution in value caused by
the taking.355 Even though this system would increase government
costs in the rare occasion that street art raised property value, requiring just compensation is an important deterrent on the potentially tyrannical and disparate application of street art ordinances.356 Thus, the property owner would receive the benefit of the
352

See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34–35 (1954) (reasoning that a redevelopment
plan aimed at removing blighted areas had to be instituted by exercising eminent domain
over entire sections of communities, not just building by building; thus, one hold-out
owner could potentially jeopardize the entire redevelopment scheme.).
353
See Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation
of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND. J. ECON. 557 (1986) (factoring in litigation costs as a major
factor in deciding to litigate claims).
354
See Henderer, supra note 114, at 409 n.2 (discussing the deterrent effect that
litigation costs have on commencing inverse condemnation proceedings. “Due to the
amount of time, money, and energy required to litigate a takings claim, many of the cases
in the Takings Clause jurisprudence involve particularly valuable pieces of real property
and parties with significant resources.”).
355
See supra notes 110, 118, 150, and 282 and accompanying text.
356
See James G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69
MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1985) (discussing the deterrent effect that the just
compensation requirement of the Takings Clause has on a government body when
deciding to institute a taking).
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increase in his property value, and the government would also be
able to maintain its police power to institute a uniform cityplanning scheme that promotes public welfare.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to make sense of two areas of study
that present grey areas of understanding: the street art subculture
and how the Takings Clause governs laws that seek to counter this
subculture. While Takings Clause doctrine may not require just
compensation for the removal of street art, this Article argues that
underlying principles of such doctrine point in the direction for future change to accommodate such protection. This Article has offered a unique perspective of Takings Clause doctrine and attempts
to point out novel applications and solutions that would push
boundaries to both protect interests of city governments in protecting public welfare as well as protecting the economic rights of
property owners seeking to maximize their property values. As the
law continues to develop and street art continues to gain popularity, it will be interesting to see the discussion around these topics
expand in courts and future scholarship.

